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Abstract
Which is the best, impartially most plausible consensus view to serve as the basis
of democratic group decision when voters disagree? Assuming that the judgment ag-
gregation problem can be framed as a matter of judging a set of binary propositions
(“issues”), we develop a multi-issue majoritarian approach based on the criterion of
supermajority efficiency (SME). SME reflects the idea that smaller supermajorities
must yield to larger supermajorities so as to obtain better supported, more plausible
group judgments. As it is based on a partial ordering, SME delivers unique outcomes
only in special cases. In general, one needs to make cardinal, not just ordinal, trade-
offs between different supermajorities. Hence we axiomatically characterize the class
of additive majority rules, whose (generically unique) outcome can be interpreted as
the “on balance most plausible” consensus judgment.
1 Introduction
1.1 Preference aggregation vs. judgement aggregation
The dominant paradigm of decision-making group in groups by voting is preference ag-
gregation. In preference aggregation, inputs —(votes) are understood to express what is
best for each voter personally. The crux of preference aggregation is a conflict of interest.
The normative question is thus how to best resolve those conflicts of interest in a fair and
efficient manner.
An alternative paradigm of decision-making in groups by voting is judgement aggre-
gation (JA). In JA, inputs (votes) concern judgements on the best course of action for
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the group as a collective agent. Inputs are views about what the group should do, about
which decision is right. These judgements may be about the best choice directly, or may
concern the basis for such choice in views about what is right as a matter of, say justice
or law, or in beliefs about matters of uncertain fact. The crux of judgement aggregation is
disagreement ; the output (group choice) aims at a disagreement resolution by means of a
consensus. A good consensus is one that has most merit in light of the input judgements.
The normative standard is thus, broadly speaking, “epistemic” rather than “ethical”.
In this paper, we adopt the less common, and, in our view, still underdeveloped judge-
ment aggregation perspective. Our aim is to develop a broadly applicable “multi-issue ma-
joritarian” (MIM) approach whose intellectual ancestry can be tracked back to Condorcet
(1785) via Guilbaud (1952). While much of the JA literature has focused on impossibility
results, we offer a possibility result by providing a general axiomatic characterization of a
(novel) class of aggregation rules called additive majority rules (AMR). This class encom-
passes the widely-studied class of median rules. See the end of the introduction for the
connection to the literature, and section 2 for an informal outline of the basic ideas and
axioms underlying our results.
While we do not pin down here a uniquely optimal majoritarian aggregation rule, we
obtain a parsimoniously characterized class; this compares favorably to the veritable “zoo”
of majoritarian rules in the standard voting literature. We will develop the motivation
and content of the majoritarian approach further in the outline section of the paper. In
the remainder of the introduction, we will flesh out and motivate the broader judgement
aggregation perspective a bit more, as it is not very familiar or even well-understood.
Indeed, by providing a well-structured possibility result that is applicable across a range
of different settings, we hope to contribute to the broader conceptual development of
judgement aggregation as well.
The JA perspective often arises naturally from the institutional context of the voting
problem. For example, committees are often asked to come up with a decision that is
effective or binding for a larger polity. Such committees include corporate boards, central
banks, juries of various kinds, and multi-member courts, including supreme courts. “Ag-
gregation” here is about making best use of the committee members’ judgemental inputs,
rather than about figuring out how best to satisfy their personal preferences.1
But the JA perspective is pertinent not only to committees with delegated decision
power, but also to polities with sovereign decision power. Regarding decisions for public
office, one can argue that there is an important distinction between voting on personal
preference and voting on a more impersonal view of the merit or quality of the candidate.
The merit-oriented perspective was indeed the stance of Lull (1299), Cusanus (1434) and
Condorcet (1785) in their pioneering contributions to social choice theory; it has been pow-
erfully developed more recently by Balinski and Laraki (2010). In political referenda, the
preference aggregation perspective is sometimes the natural one (for instance in decisions
on local public goods), but frequently the natural emphasis is on the perceived merit of a
1Of course, making judgements does not presuppose disinterestedness. It will often, if not always, be
associated with a preference for obtaining a group judgement and choice that is aligned with one’s own
judgement. “Strategic manipulability” of votes is thus a concern for judgement aggregation as it is for
preference aggregation.
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decision, as in referenda, say, on same-sex marriage, to give an example of current interest.
In many situations, such as decisions on taxation and redistribution, both perspectives will
be pertinent and illuminating.
The relative prevalence of the two perspectives is quite different in different disciplines.
In economics, the preference aggregation perspective dominates almost entirely. By con-
trast, a broader view of group decision by voting is frequently taken in political science
and political philosophy, and the JA perspective is much more prevalent, as exemplified
by the work of authors such as Waldron (1999), Christiano (2008), Estlund (2008), List
and Pettit (2011), and Schwartzberg (2015) .
Much of the more formal literature on JA themes is devoted to variants of the Condorcet
Jury Theorem (CJT), which asserts the ability of majorities made of minimally competent
voters to discover the truth. Its appeal to the notion of truth in the context of voting
and its reliance on statistical models (often with strong assumptions) has made the CJT
approach somewhat controversial (see Section 2.2.2); by contrast, the approach here, while
broadly epistemic, does not rely on statistical arguments.
1.2 The range of judgement aggregation
Standard voting theory from a preference aggregation perspective has a standard format:
its input is a set of linear or weak orders, and its output is either a social welfare order, or
the set of “best” (i.e. “social welfare maximizing” or “fairest”) choices. By contrast, JA
comes in a great variety of formats and structures. We shall mention and briefly describe
some of them, but there are many others. The MIM approach is applicable to all of them,
sometimes with more, sometimes less degrees of freedom, sometimes with few (if any)
evident alternatives, sometimes with strong competitors.
• The most direct JA counterpart to the standard preference aggregation model as-
sumes that choice is derived from a comparative evaluation of “merit” or “choice-
worthiness” of the alternatives. Each voter submits a ranking of the alternatives,
expressing her view of comparative merit. A JA rule then determines a “most plau-
sible” consensus ranking as the basis for choice of the group. Thus, ranking aggrega-
tion is formally identical to Arrovian preference aggregation, but it concerns rankings
rather than preference orders. (See Example 4.1 below for details.)
• Alternatively, the evaluation of merit could be non-comparative, as in grading based
on a commonly understood scale. Such non-comparative evaluations are common in
athletic or artistic competitions. Although the “grading” of political candidates for
office is not common, it is conceptually meaningful. Indeed, it has been proposed and
thoroughly elaborated, both theoretically and empirically, in the recent magisterial
work by Balinski and Laraki (2010) on “Majority Judgement”.
• In many instances, the proximate task of judgement aggregation is to aggregate
“beliefs” rather than directly evaluations of overall merit. These beliefs could be
quantitative; in particular, they may take the form of subjective probabilities. There
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is a sizeable literature on the aggregation of probability judgements, most of it in-
volving some form of averaging, and hardly any of it majoritarian (Genest and Zidek,
1986).
• In other settings, such as legal ones, a qualitative model of belief as the acceptance of
propositions is common and natural. These propositions may concern matters of fact
or matters of law. The acceptance model has inspired the Doctrinal Paradox due to
Kornhauser and Sager (1986) and much of the recent JA literature following it; see
in particular List and Pettit (2002). Since the qualitative belief model already comes
with a binary issue-frame, the MIM approach seems very natural in this setting.
• There are many other examples. We will elaborate one due to Tangian (2014) in Sec-
tion 3.1. Tangian’s model, which we shall call Virtual Referendum Voting (VRV),
attempts to inject elements of direct democracy into an overall political framework
of representative democracy. We consider the simplest version in which one “rep-
resentative” (governing person or governing party) is to be elected on the basis of
its views on a number of dichotomous issues that are selected so as to represent the
“ideological space”. VRV represents a complement of sorts to Balinski and Laraki’s
“candidate quality” model.
In some settings, there exist serious normative competitors to majoritarian aggregation
rules. These are often of an averaging type. As mentioned above, in the literature on
aggregating subjective probabilities, averaging-type rules predominate. In aggregating
rankings, the Borda rule (which averages ranks) is a prominent alternative, while in aggre-
gating grades, the average grade is an obvious alternative to the median grade. Whether
or not these other criteria have real normative appeal, there will often still be strong con-
siderations of a “second-best optimality” nature that favor majoritarian aggregation rules,
and in particular, additive majority rules, as sounder and more reliable. Broadly speak-
ing, majoritarian aggregation rules are likely to work better than averaging rules with
lower-quality judgemental input, and to incentivize higher-quality input at the same time.
Firstly, averaging is highly sensitive to individual judgements. As Galton (1907) observed,
the average “gives voting power to cranks in proportion to their crankiness”; Galton thus
championed the median, as the least exposed to the influence of unreasonable or erratic
opinions. (Note that robustness to cranks is a concern distinctive of judgement aggrega-
tion; by contrast, from a preference aggregation perspective, there is no reason to discount
unusual preferences.)
Secondly, averaging provides strong and clear-cut incentives for any voter (judge) to
submit a more extreme judgement. Additive majority rules, by contrast, appear to be
significantly more robust against strategic manipulation. In particular, on JA spaces where
fully strategy-proof anonymous and neutral aggregation rules exist at all, these rule take
the form of issue-by-issue majority voting, and are thus AMRs.2 AMRs enjoy also “partial
strategy-proofness” properties.3
2Cf. Nehring and Puppe (2007, 2010) building upon Barbera` et al. (1997).
3See, e.g. Bossert and Sprumont (2014) for the Kemeny rule in the ranking problem.
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AMRs are new in the literature, but special cases are not. The median rule, in par-
ticular, has been studied extensively. In the context of the ranking problem, the median
rule is also known as the Kemeny rule (1959), and has been axiomatized in the classic
contribution by Young and Levenglick (1978). The median rule has been studied quite ex-
tensively for other special classes of judgement spaces as well (Barthe´le´my and Monjardet,
1981, 1988; Barthe´le´my and Janowitz, 1991; McMorris et al., 2000).
In addition, two “limiting” cases of AMRs have been studied in the special context of
the ranking problem. These are the Slater rule (1961), and the Ranked Pairs rule proposed
by Tideman (1987). While these do not satisfy SME strictly, and hence are not proper
AMRs, they posses refinements that are proper AMRs, as described in Section 4.
A technically interesting feature of our analysis is the need for representations rang-
ing over the hyperreal numbers rather than just real numbers.4 For example, to ensure
SME, the refinements of the Ranked Pairs and Slater rule both require hyperreal-valued
representations. We hope that our techniques may be useful in other applications to social
choice and decision theory.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an informal
outline of the basic argument, emphasizing intuition and concepts. Section 3 introduces
and illustrates the general framework, which goes beyond the standard JA model by allow-
ing an asymmetric treatment of issues via asymmetric (non-uniform) issue weights, and
by allowing input and output spaces to differ. Section 4 formally defines the axiom of
supermajority efficiency and the class of additive majority rules. Section 5 contains our
main result: an axiomatic characterization of these rules. Appendix A is a brief formal
introduction to hyperreal numbers. Appendices B to F contain the proofs of all the results
in the text.
2 Outline of the argument
2.1 The plausibility argument for majority vote
Consider a group faced with a single yes-no decision, which hinges on which alternative is
more just, or more in accordance with existing law. Out of the nine members, five favor a
“Yes”, four a “No”. In view of the disagreement, the nine members decide to consult an
outside advisor whose sole task is to advise, from her detached, “impartial” point of view,
which decision has greater merit on the basis of the anonymized profile of votes alone. The
members agree to adopt the advisor’s counsel as their consensus decision.
The advisor’s task is easy, in view of the meagerness of information that characterizes
her task. She reasons as follows. I have no basis to distinguish among the nine submitted,
anonymized votes. Hence all must count equally. If the vote count was four against four
with eight members, there would be equally strong reasons to support both judgements,
and I would have no basis to advise for or against one of them. Yet, in point of fact, there
4Representations using the hyperreal numbers or other linearly ordered algebraic structures have a
long history and decision and social choice theory. See e.g. Halpern (2010,§1) and Pivato (2013a,§7.1) for
summaries of this literature. A prominent example in social choice theory is Smith (1973).
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is an additional fifth vote in favor of “Yes”; so this tilts the “balance of argument” in favor
of Yes, however slightly. We shall say that Yes is “more plausible” or “more plausibly
correct”, and refer to the above argument as the Plausibility Argument for majority vote.
In special cases, judgements admit an independent, fact-like standard of truth; one
might then refine the criterion of plausibility to the more specific one of probability. If
judgements are “truth-apt” in this way, the question of optimal judgement aggregation
might be turned into a question of optimal statistical inference. This is done in the liter-
ature departing from the celebrated Condorcet Jury Theorem; see subsection 2.2.2 below
for a more detailed discussion.
However, in this paper, we do not rely on the assumption of truth-aptness, and thus
avoid the rather heroic assumptions underlying much of the work in the statistical vein.
Even without truth-aptness, judgement is not an entirely subjective affair of mere like
and dislike. Some judgement are better-grounded than others; let’s call such judgements
“plausibility apt”. Many judgements in matters of law or of justice seem to be of this
kind.5 Indeed, without some notion of epistemic merit such as “plausibility aptitude”, how
could one otherwise make sense of any notion of disagreement about the right course of
action, in contrast to simple difference in preference?
2.2 Majoritarianism in complex decisions
How can the logic of this “plausibility argument for majority voting” be extended to more
complex decisions? Following a line of intellectual ancestry going back to Condorcet, we
will develop a “multi-issue majoritarian” (MIM) approach which assumes that a complex
decision/judgement aggregation problem can be sensibly broken down into a set of binary
yes-one issues. Formally, we will posit a set K, whose elements represent properties or
propositions which can affirmed or denied; we will refer to the elements of K as issues, and
refer to K itself as a frame. We also posit a set X ⊆{±1}K, describing the set of “coherent”
or “admissible” views —we call this a judgement space, and refer to elements of X as views.
In many (but not all) cases, a particular frame stands out as the “natural” one. As in
most of the judgement aggregation literature, we take the frame as given.6 Multi-issue
Majoritarianism evaluates the overall plausibility of a view based on the sign and size of
the majority margins on each issue in K. If the issue-wise majorities yield a coherent
result (in the so-called “Condorcet consistent” case), then this is the most plausible group
judgement; otherwise, additional considerations must be invoked to arrive at a suitably
discriminative judgement.
Example 2.1. (Grading) Let (G, >) be a finite, linearly ordered set; we will refer to the
elements of G as grades. For each candidate for some position or office, each voter judges
5Obviously, this is rich – and slippery – philosophical terrain. We don’t aim to make any philosophically
sharp distinctions, but appeal to certain intuitive and common understandings. Sharper conceptual work
would likely bear valuable fruit, though.
6In the literature, the frame is often referred to as the agenda or property space. The framing decision
itself can be viewed as a separate matter of delegated or group decision. Indeed, Condorcet (1788, p.
140-141) himself devoted some thought to the role of such an issue framing committee.
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the candidate’s quality by means of a grade in G. Which is the best supported or “most
plausible” consensus grade for each candidate?
A majoritarian answer can be given by representing the assignment of grades with a
frame K = {kg}g∈G, where the issue kg represents the statement “the candidate merits
grade g or above”. The assignment of a grade g can then be identified with a |G|-tuple of
yes-no (±1) judgements, i.e. formally with an element xg of the Hamming cube {±1}K.
For concreteness, let G = {1, 2 . . . , 7}, with the usual ordering; the grade “6” is then
represented by the 7-tuple (+1,+1,+1,+1,+1,+1,−1). The judgement space X consists
of the seven views {xg : g ∈ G}.
Consider a profile of five voters who submit the grades 2, 3, 6, 6 and 7 for candidate
C. For all issues g ≤ 6, a majority of voters affirms the judgement “C merits grade g or
above”, while for g = 7, a majority of four out of five voters deny the judgement. Hence,
the issue-wise majority judgement is the 7-tuple (+1,+1,+1,+1,+1,+1,−1). As this is
coherent, corresponding to the assignment of grade “6”, the grade 6 is the “impartially
most plausible”, hence the consensus view. Note that, at this and any other profile, the
consensus grade agrees with the median of individual grades. It follows that with this issue-
framing, MIM coincides with a basic version of Balinski and Laraki’s “majority grade”.7
♦
By always yielding a coherent issue-wise majority view, the grading example is rather
special. By contrast, in many other judgement aggregation problems, there will be profiles
at which the issue-wise majority view will be incoherent. At such profiles, the issue-wise
plausibilities point in different directions, and the best balance of plausibilities must be
determined by additional considerations.
Think of the “plausibility” of views at a given profile in terms of a partial order “more
plausible than”. A baseline —to be refined further —is the partial ordering according to
Condorcet dominance. A view x Condorcet dominates another view y if x agrees with the
majority view on all issues on which y agrees with the majority view, and some others.
Equivalently, for any issue in which x and y differ, x agrees with the majority and y
does not. So x is clearly “issue-wise more plausible” than y, hence y is ruled out as a
possible consensus view. Those views not Condorcet dominated by some other coherent
view are the Condorcet admissible views. A profile is Condorcet consistent if has a unique
Condorcet admissible view, which holds if and only if the issue-wise majority view is itself
coherent (Nehring et al., 2014, Lemma 1.5). In some judgement spaces (K,X ) such as the
space of grades in Example 2.1, all profiles (with an odd number of voters) are Condorcet
consistent.8 But in all other judgement spaces, there are profiles which admit multiple
Condorcet admissible views. Indeed, such indeterminacy arises frequently, and can be
quite severe (Nehring et al., 2014, 2016; Nehring and Pivato, 2014). These indeterminacy
phenomena roughly parallel and generalize the potentially extreme indeterminacy of the
top cycle demonstated in a classical contribution by McKelvey (1986).
7Balinski and Laraki refine the aggregation in order to resolve ties among multiple candidates with
equal median grades, but such ties need not concern us here.
8These are exactly the median spaces (Nehring and Puppe, 2010; Bandelt and Barthelemy, 1984).
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To select among Condorcet admissible views, some balancing of plausibilities is needed.
This can be done by refining the baseline partial ordering by taking into account the size
of the issue-wise majorities —information that was ignored by Condorcet admissibility,
which only exploited their sign. The idea is simple: larger majorities make a stronger case
for adopting the judgement they support. Such ordinal plausibility tradeoffs lead to the
refined criterion of Supermajority Efficiency (SME).
To motivate this criterion, consider the classical problem of ranking three alternatives.
This ranking problem is naturally framed in terms of three issues, corresponding to the
three comparisons a vs. b, b vs. c, and a vs. c. Suppose that, among 12 voters, 5 have the
ranking (in downward order) abc, 4 have the ranking bca, and 3 have the ranking cab. At
this profile, a net majority of 5+4−3 = 6 ranks b above c, a net majority of 4 ranks a above
b, and a net majority of 2 ranks c above a. Thus, we have a Condorcet cycle. Condorcet
Admissibility discards the rankings cba, acb and bac, which conflict with the majority view
on two out of three issues, but it does not select among the remaining three rankings. Yet
these are not on par, as they are not equally plausible from an impartial point of view.
Compare, for example, the Condorcet admissible rankings abc and cab. Both agree on the
ranking of a above b, but they disagree on the other two comparisons. But abc departs
from the majority view on an issue with a near tie (on a vs. c with a margin of 2), while the
ranking cab departs from the majority view on an issue with a larger majority margin of 6.
So from an impartial perspective, abc is more plausible than cab. By a similar argument,
abc is also more plausible than bca, and is thus the most plausible ranking. Thus, it is the
best consensus judgement from a majoritarian perspective.
Note that this argument relies only on ordinal comparisons of the majority margins.
This observation motivates our general notion of Supermajority Efficiency, which is de-
signed to give maximal leverage to such ordinal comparisons. In general settings, these
comparisons may be more involved than the simple pairwise comparisons in the case of
ranking three alternatives. In a nutshell, a view x supermajority dominates another y, if
for any given majority margin q, the view x agrees with supermajorities of size at least
q on at least as many issues as y does, and, for some q, on more. (We will provide a
precise definition in Section 3.) A view is supermajority efficient if it is not supermajority
dominated by any other admissible view.
In the ranking problem with three alternatives, the argument for the profile above
generalizes, and it is easy to see that there is (generically) a unique SME view. In more
complex situations, however, the SME criterion may still leave some indeterminacy. This
is the case, for example, in the ranking problem with four or more alternatives. Then
there exist profiles and views (that is: rankings) x and y such that x departs from the
(incoherent) majority view on a single issue with a margin of, say 70%−30% = 40%, while
y departs from the majority view on two issues with margins of, say, 61% − 39% = 22%
each. Which of these two rankings is more plausible —if either —is not self-evident. A
straightforward vote counting criterion suggests x is superior (since 2× 22% > 40%). But
the opposite trade-off might be justified as well. For example, one could also argue that the
two smaller 22% majority margins for x are closer to “toss ups”, and thus contribute less
than proportionately to overall plausibility of a view than the single larger 40% margins
for y. Put differently, only large majorities contain a meaningful “signal”, while small
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majorities contain mostly “noise”.
Either way, settling on a best consensus in situations of this kind turns on making car-
dinal trade-offs between super-majorities of different size. The main result of this paper,
Theorem 1, shows that if a supermajority-efficient judgement aggregation rule makes these
tradeoffs in a systematic and consistent manner across profiles by satisfying an additional
axiom (Combination), it must be equal to (or select from) an additive majority rule. Such
a rule is characterized by a “gain function” φ, which maps “majority margins” into “plau-
sibilities”. For any profile µ (summarizing the views of the voters), and any admissible






where µ˜k is the majority margin for +1 in issue k, and the views(s) with maximal overall
plausibility is chosen as consensus view. The gain function φ is increasing, and can be
assumed without loss of generality to be odd (i.e. φ (−r) = −φ (r) for all r).9
This completes the outline of the basic argument of the paper. The formal development
in Section 3 generalizes the classical set-up along a number of dimensions. In particular,
issues may be weighted unequally, and the admissibility constraints for input and output
judgements may differ. But before going into the technical details of this framework,
we conclude this Section with a few remarks on the scope and orientation of the overall
contribution.
2.2.1 Consensus vs. Compromise
Among additive majority rules, one stands out: the rule in which plausibility is simply
proportional to net majority —i.e. in which the gain function φ is linear. It has been
extensively studied in the literature under the name of the median rule and, in the special
case of the ranking problem, it is the Kemeny rule. Median rules are unique among AMRs
in admitting an interpretation as minimizing the average distance of the group view to the
individual views, where distance among views is given by the number of issues on which
the views differ.
By consequence, median rules are distinctively attractive from a compromise perspec-
tive. From a compromise perspective, the distance of a group view from an individual
view can be interpreted as a measure of the “burden of compromise” imposed on the in-
dividual voter; the median rule can then be viewed as minimizing the aggregate burden
of compromise. In a companion paper (Nehring and Pivato, 2018), we provide an ax-
9For most but not all purposes, plausibility can be taken to be real-valued. However, real-valuedness
is not sufficiently general for both material and technical reasons. In general, we must allow φ to be
hyperreal-valued; hyperreal numbers have just the same arithmetic rules as the reals, but include infinite
and infinitesimal numbers besides the reals.
Hyperreals will be seen to be much more accessible and user-friendly for our purposes than their repu-
tation may suggest. In particular, no background in non-standard analysis is required to fully understand
the paper. In any case, there is little loss to the big picture if a reader neglects the distinction between
reals and hyperreals
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iomatic foundation of the median rule within the general framework of this paper, but
under additional assumptions on the structure of the judgement problem.
2.2.2 “Plausible”, not “Probable”
While we have settled here for plausibility, much of the literature on epistemic group deci-
sion making aims at more, namely probability. Following Condorcet’s (1785) classic Jury
Theorem, this literature assumes that there is an independent standard of “truth” by which
the accuracy of judgement decisions can be measured. On the basis of statistical model-
ing, it attempts to determine the extent and conditions under which majority decisions
are likely to be correct, even in cases, in which individual competence is low.10 This line
of reasoning can also be used to justify particular JA rules; a leading example is Young’s
(1988) reconstruction of Condorcet’s derivation of the Kemeny rule as a maximum likeli-
hood estimator. But there are good reasons to doubt whether this quasi-empirical line of
reasoning can provide a sound basis for a normative account of group decision as disagree-
ment resolution.11
The CJT approach runs into two problems in particular. First, not all matters of
reasonable disagreement are truth-apt. Arguably, aiming at “the best” decision does not
presuppose that there exists an independent external standard (“truth”) as to what this
best decision is. For example, in matters of justice and law, disagreeing opinions (and
supporting discourses) are arguably all we have.
Second, even if the matter is truth-apt, it is sometimes doubtful whether a sound
statistical argument is available. Consider, for example, the aforementioned Condorcet-
Young maximum likelihood argument for the median rule. That argument rests on two
strong modeling assumptions of stochastic independence: independence across voters and
independence across issues. Both of these are questionable, and the inferred maximum-
likelihood estimator is highly sensitive to both. Thus, a strand of the recent literature
has been devoted to relaxing these independence assumptions (Peleg and Zamir, 2012;
Dietrich and Spiekermann, 2013a,b; Pivato, 2013b, 2017). Yet, even if these assumptions
are dropped, one is often still left with a difficult statistical inference problem with a
tenuous data base. In some cases, the group itself might have to address this problem to
arrive at a consensus decision. But this itself could be a significant source of disagreement.
Hence, even if statistical arguments have undeniable value as thought experiments, their
value as a basis for resolving disagreement in a group may be somewhat limited.
3 Formal Framework
Let K be a finite set of issues. A view on K is an element x ∈ {±1}K, where xk = 1 if x
“asserts” proposition k, and xk = −1 if x “denies” proposition k. A judgement space is a
subset X ⊆ {±1}K; typically X is the set of views which are “admissible” or “coherent”
according to our interpretation of the elements of K.
10See Goodin and Spiekermann (2018) for a book length treatment.
11According to McLean and Urken (1995, p. 27-38), Condorcet himself vacillated between “probabilistic”
and “straightforward” reasoning. Here we have articulated the “straightforward” line of reasoning.
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We have already given two specific examples of judgement spaces: linearly ordered
grades and the space of linear orders on a finite set of alternatives. Another example is
truth-functional aggregation, much studied in the early literature on judgement aggregation
inspired by Kornhauser and Sager’s (1986) Doctrinal Paradox. Here the frame K consists of
a set of logically independent premises P and a conclusion c that is logically determined by
the premises; the judgement space X ⊂ {±1}K is the set of logically consistent assignments
of truth values. For instance, if K = {p, q, c} and c is the conjunction of p and q, then X =
{x ∈ {±1}K; xc = min(xp, xq)}.) More generally, with K = P ∪ {c}, the truth-functional
judgement spaces are characterized by the condition that, for all x ∈ X , (xP , xc) ∈ X if
and only if (xP ,−xc) /∈ X .
Other judgement spaces encode social decision problems such as resource allocation,
committee selection, and object classification; some of these examples appear later in this
paper, while others are discussed by Nehring and Puppe (2007), Nehring and Pivato (2011,
2014), and Nehring et al. (2014, 2016).
The standard judgement aggregation framework typically imposes the same admissib-
lity/coherence conditions on input and output judgements. But we allow those to differ,
denoting the space of admissible output views by X and that of admissible input views by
Y , with X ⊆ Y . For the purposes of this paper, this added generality comes essentially
for free. It can arise in different ways. In the ranking problem, for example, one may not
want to insist on the coherence (transitivity) of individual input comparisons, but require
a transitive output ranking to produce a well-defined choice correspondence. In a legal
setting, the public justification of a court decision may need to conform to an articulated
legal doctrine described by a truth-functional implication, but the reasoning of individual
court members may be allowed greater latitude.
Multi-issue majoritarianism must deal with tradeoffs in the alignment of the group view
with the majorities on different issues – this, again, is the key motivation for the central
axiom of supermajority efficiency. In many judgement problems (such as the ranking
problem), it is natural to treat all issue on par ; at a purely formal level, such parity of
issues is underpinned by the structural symmetry of the ranking space under permutations
of the alternatives. In other settings, such symmetries may be absent, and there may even
be an intrinsic asymmetry among issues. In truth-functional aggregation, for example,
there is a fundamental conceptual asymmetry between premises and conclusions. Indeed,
in the literature on the Doctrinal Paradox, a major theme has been the question whether
the aggregation should be driven by aggregation of premises first, with the conclusion
derivative, or by aggregation of the conclusion first. These can be viewed as extreme
stances along a continuum in which premises and conclusions receive different weights.
We are thus lead to generalize the notion of a judgement space (K,X ) to that of a
judgement context as a quadruple C = (K,λ,X ,Y), where K is a finite set of issues,
λ = (λk)k∈K ∈ RK+ is a positive weight vector, and X ⊆ Y ⊆ {±1}K.
To focus on the case of issue parity, we will frequently drop reference to the weight vector
λ, and refer to an unweighted judgement context as a triple (K,X ,Y). Formally, unweighted
judgement contexts can be identified with judgement contexts with unit weights, i.e. for
which λk = 1 for all k ∈ K.




y∈Y µ(y) = 1. An element µ ∈ ∆(Y) is called a profile, and describes
a population of (weighted) voters; for each y ∈ Y , the value of µ(y) is the total weight
of the voters who hold the view y.12 The primary interpretation of a profile µ is as a
frequency distribution of the input judgments among anoymous, hence equally weighted
voters. But, more generally, µ can also incorporate weights which may reflect different
voter expertise or standing.13
If C = (K,λ,X ,Y) is a judgement context and µ ∈ ∆(Y) is a profile, then we call the
pair (C;µ) a judgement problem. A judgement aggregation rule on C is a correspondence
F : ∆(Y) ⇒ X . If F (µ) 6= ∅ for all µ ∈ ∆(Y), then we say F is total. Otherwise, F
is partial. Most judgement aggregation rules of interest are total. However, we will not
assume that rules are total in this paper. Allowing for partiality is a simple but flexible
device to accommodate restrictions on the domain of possible inputs.
In some applications, it is more appropriate to define a single judgement aggregation
rule for an entire collection of judgement contexts, rather than a single context. For exam-
ple, many rules for aggregating rankings (e.g. the Kemeny and Slater rules) or aggregating
grades (e.g. Balinski and Laraki’s Majority Judgement) are applicable to any number of
alternatives. Likewise, many rules for selecting a committee are applicable to any number
of candidates, and often have considerable flexibility with respect to the other constraints
on the desired committee (e.g. minimum or maximum size). For this reason, we will often
assume that the domain of a judgement aggregation rule is a (possibly infinite) collection
E of judgement contexts —we will call such a collection a judgement environment. (We will
make this precise in Section 5.)
3.1 An example: Virtual Referendum Voting
In Virtual Referendum Voting (VRV), a unique “candidate” is to be elected as the gov-
erning agent on the basis of how well his/its position on a number of Yes-No issues with
the views of the electorate. The candidate could be a person, party, or coalition of parties.
The uniqueness assumption is for simplicity only.
A model of this kind has been proposed by Tangian, and is summarized in his recent
monograph, A mathematical model of democracy (2014).14 In the most ambitious vein,
the model could be used as a blueprint for an actual voting procedure. Less ambitiously
but still informatively, the model can be used as an analytical foil to compare the actual
outcomes of elections to those in a hypothetical issue oriented procedure.15 It has already
received some empirical evaluation, and also ties in nicely with (typically web-based) voter
assistance systems popular in many European countries, which are meant to inform and
12See formula (C1) in Appendix C for more detail.
13For the sake of generality, we allow profiles to be real-valued. Real-valued weights could capture
anonymous aggregation with an infinite (continuum) of voters, or real-valued weights assigned to a finite
set of voters. None of our results depends on this generality. In fact, a version of the main result holds
also for a fixed number of anonymous voters (Theorem 3).
14The label “Virtual Referendum Voting” is ours, though, not his.
15Tangian himself is motivated by a perceived decline of representative democracy in favor of a person-
ality oriented “audience democracy” diagnosed by influential political historian Bernard Manin (1995).
Of course, this is not the place to discuss the potential and limitations of the model in substance.
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educate for voters on how the various parties align with their own views on a number of
prespecified issues (Cedroni and Garzia, 2010).
In VRV, K is a set of political issues formulated as propositions to be approved or
rejected. An element of {±1}K can be thought of as a position in ideological space. The
set of issues K is intended to be broadly representative of the overall decision-relevant
ideological space. So, in voter assistance applications, K typically involves between 5 and
50 issues. Voters express their views as positions, so Y = {±1}K. The candidates declare
their positions as well; we will identify each candidate with her declared position (ignoring
questions about the sincerity or reliability of this declaration). So X , the available set of
candidates, is typically a small some subset of {±1}K. Some issues might be deemed more
important that others, as reflected in the weight vector λ. There is no abstract argument
for issue parity here, but uniform priority weights might be sensible if the issues are selected
appropriately. Clearly, the selection of the issues and their weights is itself a substantial
decision. It could be made, for example, via some form of judgement aggregation by some
committee of outside experts, or by the voters themselves.
The determination of the best candidate can be viewed as a problem of judgement
aggregation. In particular, the best consensus candidate would be the one maintaining the
“impartially most plausible” views on most positions in light of the profile of votes. The
judgement aggregation rule F selecting the consensus candidates could be defined for a
single context associated with a single feasible set of candidates in fixed position. But it
would be more natural to let the candidates’ positions vary as well, so that the judgement
aggregation rule is defined for a judgement environment E —say, the set of all contexts
(K,λ,X , {±1}K), where K and λ are fixed and X is any subset of {±1}K, or any subset
of fixed cardinality m. Our main result yields an axiomatization of the general class of
weighted AMRs for this model.16
4 Supermajority efficiency and additive majority rules
Let (K,λ,X ,Y) be a judgement context. Recall that Y ⊆ {±1}K —regard Y as a subset
of RK in the obvious way. For any profile µ ∈ ∆(Y), we define the majority vector µ˜ =




µ(y) · yk for all k ∈ K. (4.1)




{λk ; k ∈ K such that xk µ˜k ≥ q}. (4.2)
This measures the total weight of the issues in which the popular support for x exceeds the
supermajority threshold q. In the special case of a uniform priority vector λ = 1, we have
γ1µ,x(q) = γµ,x(q), where
γµ,x(q) := #{k ∈ K ; xk µ˜k ≥ q}. (4.3)
16Tangian himself considered (on heuristic, not axiomatic grounds) the median rule, another AMR, and
the Slater rule, which is refinable to an AMR.
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This counts the number of issues in which the popular support for x exceeds the super-
majority threshold q. For example, γµ,x(0) is the number of coordinates where x receives
at least a bare majority, γµ,x(0.5) is the number of coordinates where x receives at least a
75% supermajority, and γµ,x(1) is the number of coordinates where x receives unanimous
support.
For any x,y ∈ X , we write “xλ
µ
y” (“x weakly supermajority-dominates y” ) if
γλµ,x(q) ≥ γλµ,y(q) for all q ∈ (0, 1]. This relation is transitive and reflexive, but generally
not complete. We write “x≡λ
µ







y (equivalently, γλµ,x(q) = γ
λ
µ,y(q) for all q ∈ (0, 1]). Finally, we write “xλµ y” (“x
supermajority-dominates y”) if x
λ
µ
y but x 6≡λ
µ
y. A view x is supermajority efficient (SME)




set of SME views will be denoted by SME (C;µ). Formally,
SME (C;µ) :=
{
x ∈ X ; yλ
µ
x for no y ∈ X
}
.
In the special case of the uniform priority vector 1, we drop the “λ” argument in these
expressions, and simply write “x
µ
y” etc..
Supermajority efficiency thus mandates overruling, if necessary, small and/or low-
priority supermajorities in favor of an equal or larger number of supermajorities of equal




dorcet dominance by replacing an issue-wise comparison by a distributional comparison,
paralleling the step from statewise dominance to first-order stochastic dominance in the
theory of decision making under risk.
Example 4.1. As briefly discussed in Section 2, in the (unweighted) ranking problem
with three alternatives, at any profile, all supermajority-efficient views are supermajority-
equivalent, and, at any profile in which all three majority-margins differ, there is a unique
supermajority-efficient view. Thus, at all profiles, the SME criterion can be viewed as fully
decisive.
By contrast, with more than three alternatives, the SME criterion is no longer fully
decisive. Formally, let A := {a1, . . . , aN} be a finite set of alternatives (indexed in some
arbitrary way). Let K := {(an, am) ∈ A2; n < m}. Then any view x ∈ {±1}K can be
interpreted as a complete, antisymmetric binary relation (i.e. a tournament) ≺ on A, where
a ≺ b if and only if either xa,b = 1 or xb,a = −1. (Recall that exactly one of (a, b) or (b, a)
is in K.) Now let X ⊂ {±1}K be the set of views representing transitive tournaments (i.e.
strict preference orders) on A. The general problem of aggregating rankings over A can
be represented as judgement aggregation on X .
To illustrate the potential indecisiveness of SME in this context, suppose there are four
alternatives, a, b, c and d, let K := {(a, b), (a, c), (a, d), (b, c), (b, d), (c, d)}, and consider
a profile µ ∈ ∆(X ) with majority margins µ˜ab = µ˜ac = µ˜bc = µ˜bd = µ˜cd = α > 0, and
µ˜ad = β.
If β ≥ 0, the ranking abcd is the unique Condorcet consistent ranking. However, if
−α ≤ β < 0, there are now five Condorcet admissible rankings (namely abcd, dabc, cdab,
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bcda, and bdac), but only one of them, namely the ranking abcd, is SME. (To see this, note
abcd overrides the majority on only a single issue (namely the issue ad), while all other
rankings override the majority on at least two issues.) Finally, if β < −α, the ranking abcd
is still SME, but so are three others, namely dabc, cdab, bcda. Thus, SME is not decisive
in this case. ♦
As Example 4.1 shows, while the SME criterion is selective, it will frequently not arrive
at a unique optimal view. In such cases, one must make tradeoffs between supermajorities
of different sizes. A judgement aggregation rule F : ∆(Y)⇒ X provides a systematic way
of making such tradeoffs. To be precise, we will be interested in aggregation rules which
satisfy the following axiom:
Axiom 1 (Supermajority efficiency) F (µ) ⊆ SME (C, µ) for all µ ∈ ∆(Y).
If F satisfies Supermajority efficiency, then we will say that it is supermajority efficient.
We will use this axiom to obtain a characterization of additive majority rules. AMRs
make the tradeoff between supermajorities of various sizes in a consistent manner across
profiles and contexts. How these tradeoffs are made is determined by an increasing function
φ : [−1,+1] −→ R (called a gain function). (We will later generalize this definition a
bit, but the preliminary, real-valued definition, captures all the essential intuitions and
calculations.) Given such a function φ, the additive majority rule Fφ : ∆(Y)⇒ X is defined
as follows:















Note that any additive majority rule is total. The gain function φ describes how the
numerical strength of the majority on an issue µ˜k translates into its “effective strength”
φ (µ˜k), which determines the rate at which the majority on k is traded off against other
majorities. On a broadly epistemic interpretation, φ (µ˜k) is can be interpreted as reflecting
the strength of the plausibility argument for aligning the consensus judgement with the
majority judgement on issue k.
Qualitatively speaking, AMRs can be distinguished by the elasticity of the gain function:
how responsive the effective strength is to the numerical strength. To illustrate, consider
the following simple functional form for a gain function φd, in which d ∈ (0,∞) is the
“degree of elasticity” of the gain function.17 The corresponding additive majority rule
Hd := Fφd is called the homogeneous rule of degree d. Fig. 1 illustrates the shape of the
gain function for various values of d
17In the manner of demand theory, we can define the gain elasticity for differentiable gain-functions
locally as η (r) :=
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Figure 1: Gain functions for homogeneous rules
The median rule is the unit elasticity case, with d = 1. At the one extreme of the range,
the gain function can be highly inelastic, as illustrated by the case d = 1
10
. In the limit,
as d ↘ 0, the gain function becomes essentially a step function given by φ(r) := sign(r).
The associated AMR Fφ is an adaptation of the well-known Slater rule from ranking
aggregation to general judgement aggregation problems. (Note that the Slater rule itself is
not an AMR, because φ = sign() is not strictly increasing.) For such highly inelastic gain
functions, the overall evaluation Φ(x, µ) of a view (as defined in formula (2.1)) primarily
depends on the number of issues in which x is aligned with the majority judgement, while
the size of majority margins matters little. By contrast, for highly elastic gain functions,
small majorities matter little; the evaluation is driven primarily by the alignment of a view
with the majority view on issues with a large majority.
The emphasis on large supermajorities becomes more exacerbated as d increases; in
the limit, it becomes lexical; the limiting Leximin rule can be described as follows. For
any x,y ∈ X , write “x ≈
µ
y” if γµ,x = γµ,y; otherwise write “x µ y” if there exists some
Q ∈ (0, 1] such that γλµ,x(q) = γλµ,y(q) for all q > Q, while γλµ,x(Q) > γλµ,y(Q). Then µ is
a complete, transitive ordering of X . We then define
Leximin(C, µ) := max(X , 
µ
). (4.6)
In other words, Leximin first maximizes the total weight of coordinates which receive
unanimous support (if any); then, for every possible supermajoritarian threshold q ∈ (0, 1],
Leximin maximizes the total weight number of coordinates where the support exceeds q,
with higher values of q given lexicographical priority over lower ones.18
At first sight, the Leximin rule appears to be a natural example of an SME rule that
is not an additive majority rule, indicating a significant limitation of this family. But this
limitation is more apparent than real, since it can be overcome by allowing gain functions
to be infinite and/or infinitesimally-valued —technically, by extending the co-domain of
the gain function φ to the field ∗R of hyperreal numbers.
This step may sound difficult and somewhat esoteric, but, for our purposes, the hyper-
reals are quite straightforward and easy to use. In a nutshell, the hyperreals are extension
18The Leximin rule is a refinement of the Ranked Pairs rule proposed by Tideman (1987) in the setting
of preference aggregation; see also Zavist and Tideman (1989). The Ranked Pairs rule itself is not SME,
but it agrees with the Leximin rule on profiles µ for which µ˜k 6= µ˜` if k 6= `. A fortiori, the output of
Leximin rule on such profiles does not depend on the priority vector λ.
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of the reals which contain infinite and infinitesimal numbers, but where nonetheless all the
usual rules of arithmetic involving addition, multiplication and ordering apply.19
For example, using infinitesimals, one can easily define refinements of the Slater rule
that are additive majority rules. Let ψ : [−1, 1]−→R be any strictly increasing function,
let  ∈ ∗R be an infinitesimal, and define φ : [−1, 1]−→∗R by φ(r) := sign(r) +  ψ(r) for
all r ∈ [−1, 1]. Then the additive majority rule Fφ is a supermajority efficient refinement
of the Slater rule.20
Thus we obtain the general, “official” definition of additive majority rules simply by
changing the co-domain of the gain-function from real to hyperreal.
Definition. Let C = (K,λ,X ,Y) be a judgement context. A judgement aggregation rule
F : ∆(Y) ⇒ X is an additive majority rule if there exists a strictly increasing gain
function φ : [−1, 1]−→∗R such that, for all profiles µ ∈ ∆(Y), we have







More generally, let E be a judgement environment. An aggregation rule F on E is
an additive majority rule if there exists a gain function φ as above such that, for all
C ∈ E and all µ ∈ ∆(Y), the outcome F (C, µ) is defined by formula (4.7).21
The next result says that we can assume without loss of generality that φ is odd.
Proposition 4.2 Let φ : [−1, 1]−→∗R be any increasing gain function. Define φ̂ : [−1, 1]−→∗R
by φ̂ (r) := φ (r) − φ (−r) for r ∈ [−1, 1]. Then φ̂ is odd and increasing, and yields the
same aggregation rule, i.e. Fφ̂ = Fφ.
Proposition 4.2 is due to the fact that at a given profile µ, an aggregation rule can only
choose between affirming or overriding the majority of size |µ˜k| on a particular proposition
k. Accordingly, φ̂ (r) describes the gain from affirming rather than overriding a majority
of the same size r on any particular proposition; it follows that the gains associated with
negative majority margins are the mirror images of the gains associated with positive ones.
The following result describes some equivalent ways to represents AMRs due to oddness
of the gain function. For any µ ∈ ∆(Y), let µ˜ = (µ˜k)k∈K be defined as in formula





k∈K λk xk φ(µ˜k). Let M(µ,x) := {k ∈ K; xk µ˜k ≥ 0}. This is the set of
issues where x agrees with the majority of the voters in profile µ.
19Mathematically, ∗R is a linearly ordered field with some additional structure that, for example, even
renders exponentiation well-defined; see Appendix A for a brief introduction. No understanding of non-
standard analysis is needed. Strictly speaking, there are multiple non-identical hyperreal fields, but they
are all equivalent in their arithmetic rules; we construct an appropriate one in our proof.
20 That is, Fφ(µ) ⊆ SME (C, µ) ∩ Slater (C, µ) for any µ ∈ ∆(Y). Proof: For any x,y ∈ X , if
x ∈ Slater (C, µ) and y 6∈ Slater (C, µ), then ∑k∈K sign(µ˜k)xk > ∑k∈K sign(µ˜k) yk, which implies that
φ(µ˜) •
λ
x > φ(µ˜) •
λ
y. Thus, y 6∈ Fφ(µ). Thus, Fφ(µ) ⊆ Slater (C, µ). The supermajority efficiency of Fφ
follows from Theorem 1(a) below.
21 Here, we write “F (C, µ)” instead of “F (µ)” to emphasize the dependence on C in the case when F is
defined over a whole judgement environment E.
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Proposition 4.3 Let φ : [−1, 1]−→∗R be an odd gain function, let C = (K,λ,X ,Y) be a
judgement context, and let µ ∈ ∆(Y).














Additive majority rules have two basic attractive properties: they are monotone and gener-
ically single-valued. For any µ ∈ ∆(Y), let Y(µ) := {y ∈ Y ; µ(y) > 0}. Let µ′ ∈ ∆(Y)
and let x ∈ X . We say that µ′ is more supportive than µ of x if µ′(x) > µ(x), while
µ′(y) < µ(y) for all y ∈ Y(µ) \ {x}, and µ′(y) = µ(y) = 0 for all y ∈ Y \ Y(µ). (For
example: if δx ∈ ∆(Y) is the unanimous profile at x, then for any µ ∈ ∆(Y) and any
r ∈ (0, 1], the convex combination r δx + (1 − r)µ is more supportive than µ of x.) A
judgement aggregation rule F : ∆(Y) ⇒ X is monotone if, for any µ, µ′ ∈ ∆(Y), and
x ∈ F (µ), if µ′ is more supportive than µ of x, then F (µ′) = {x}. In other words: if x
is already one of the winning alternatives, then any increase in the support for x at the
expense of support for all other elements of X will make x the unique winning alternative.
The rule F is generically single-valued if there is an open dense subset O ⊆ ∆(Y) such that
|F (µ)| = 1 for all µ ∈ O.
Proposition 4.4 Let φ : [−1, 1]−→∗R be any gain function. For any judgement context C,
the additive majority rule Fφ is (a) monotone, and (b) generically single-valued on ∆(C).
Technically, genericity is defined only for a continuum of individuals. Nevertheless,
if the number of voters is finite but “large”, then Proposition 4.4(b) can be interpreted
heuristically as saying that ties are uncommon. However, if the number of voters is finite
but “small”, then genericity has no bearing.
5 Main result
If an aggregation rule is adopted by a group at an ex ante, constitutional stage, the group
would often want this rule to govern multiple contexts. For example, in problems of
evaluation by ranking or grading, the identity and number of alternatives (candidates)
will vary. In Virtual Referendum Voting, even if the number of candidates is fixed, their
position in ideological space will not be known ex ante. In truth-functional aggregation,
the number and nature of the premises will be unknown ex ante, as may be the syllogism
(legal doctrine) by which conclusions are derived from premises. Thus, to obtain the desired
normative foundation for AMRs, we shall consider judgement aggregation rules defined on
judgement environments.
The move from contexts to environments allows us to combine judgement contexts into
more complex “composite” judgement contexts; this will enable us to leverage the power
of the SME axiom substantially. For any contexts C1, . . . ,CJ with Cj = (Kj,λj,Xj,Yj),
22For any r ∈ R, recall that r+ := max{r, 0}.
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their combination (“product“) C1 × · · · × CJ is given by the context (K,λ,X ,Y) where
K := K1unionsq· · ·unionsqKJ , X := X1×· · ·×XJ , Y := Y1×· · ·×YJ and λ := (λ1, . . . ,λJ) (regarded
as an element of RK+ ∼= RK1+ ×· · ·×RKJ+ ). Thus, composite contexts are obtained by taking
the Cartesian products of input spaces and the output spaces; the weights of any issue
in the composite context are simply given by the weight of the issue in the component
context. In particular, if each component context has unit weight vector 1 ∈RKj , then the
composite context also has unit weight vector 1 ∈RK, the same scale of each component
context reflecting “equal importance” of each. In this manner, our definition of products in
the general, weighted case also yields a self-contained notion of product for the unweighted
(i.e. unit-weighted) case.
The combination of contexts applies to situations in which a group is faced with several
judgement problems jointly. For example, a hiring committee might have to make decisions
on different positions j ∈ [1 . . . J ] with disjoint sets of applicants Aj. For each position, the
committee members would submit a ranking of applicants on that position. The component
problem being characterized by issues Kj = Aj ×Aj, the composite problem has the issue
space K := ⊔Jj=1Kj, and the admissible input as well as output judgements are given as
J-tuples of rankings (rather than as one overall ranking of all the candidates, which would





We will require a judgement rule to pronounce on the best group judgement(s) not just
for the judgement contexts in the environment E, but for all contexts that arise from the
arbitrary combinations of contexts in E. We shall refer to this set as the closure (under
combination) of E, and denote it by 〈E〉. Formally,
〈E〉 := {C1 × · · · × CJ ; J ∈ N and C1, . . . ,CJ ∈ E}. (5.1)
Evidently, the environment 〈E〉 is itself closed under the combination of contexts, and
is the smallest collection with this property. For any judgement context C = (K,λ,X ,Y),
let o(C) := X and ∆(C) := ∆(Y). For any judgement environment E, with closure 〈E〉, let
∆〈E〉 :=
{
(C;µ) ; C ∈ 〈E〉 and µ ∈ ∆(C)
}




A judgement aggregation rule on 〈E〉 is a correspondence F : ∆〈E〉 ⇒ o〈E〉 such that, for
any C ∈ 〈E〉, we have F (C, µ) ⊆ o(C) for all µ ∈ ∆(C).
If Y := Y1 × ... × YJ , and µ ∈ ∆(Y), then for all j ∈ [1 . . . J ], let µ(j) ∈ ∆(Yj) be the
marginal projection of µ onto Yj. Formally,




µ(y1, . . . ,yJ). (5.3)
Observe that µ˜ = (µ˜(1), . . . , µ˜(J)).
We require that the group judgement on composite problems is given by combining the
optimal group judgements on each constituent problem. This is expressed by the following
axiom.
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Axiom 2 (Combination) For all contexts C1, ...,CJ ∈ E and C = C1 × ... × CJ and all
µ ∈ ∆ (C) , F (C, µ) = F (C1, µ(1))× ...× F (CJ , µ(J)).
From the broadly epistemic perspective aiming at consensus, the Combination axiom is
quite compelling, independently of whether consensus is to be construed in a majoritarian
manner or not. The group is faced simultaneously with a number of logically independent
judgement tasks; the relevant evidence for each component judgement xj is given by voters’
views on that component judgement. Hence the the “most plausible” group judgement
yielding the best supported consensus view can be determined by simply combining the
componentwise most plausible judgements independently.23
For the Combination axiom to be normatively relevant, it suffices for the combination
of judgement aggregation problems to refer to well-defined hypotheticals; whether or not
combined judgement problems are of immediate interest is of no particular relevance. At
the same time, combinations of judgement problems arise naturally in actuality within
temporal settings, when the group faces a sequence of judgement problems over time.
The Combination axiom then says the entire equence of group judgements at each date
must be optimal – according to F – when considered jointly. In particular, the combined
judgement must satisfy any normative restrictions applying to the composite context (C, µ)
—in particular, Supermajority Efficiency. This multiplies the power of the SME axiom;
indeed, these two axioms alone almost suffice to ensure representation as an AMR.
We have now all the ingredients for the main result for environments with rational-
valued weights, hence in particular for unweighted environments. For real-valued weights,
one must strengthen the requirements on the environment and the aggregation rule a
bit. Specifically, we must assume that it is possible to at least slightly vary the weight
of each context relative to other contexts in E. Formally, for any judgement context
C = (K,λ,X ,Y) and any r > 0, we define r C := (K, rλ,X ,Y). We will assume that the
environment E is minimally rich, i.e. that, for any C ∈ E, there exists  such that, r C ∈ E
for all r ∈ (1− , 1+ ). However, such a change in scale should not affect the output of the
rule within a particular context, since it leaves the relative weights of issues within that
context unchanged. This is the content of the next axiom.
Axiom 3 (Scale invariance) Let C ∈ E, let r > 0, and suppose r C ∈ E also. Then for
any µ ∈ ∆(C), we have F (C, µ) = F (r C, µ).
Note that AMRs are obviously scale-invariant, as is the SME set itself. We say that
the rule G covers the rule F if, for any µ ∈ ∆(C), F (C, µ) ⊆ G(C, µ). The rule G minimally
covers F if G is covered by any other rule that covers F . The following is our main result.
Theorem 1 Let E be a judgement environment.
23The Combination axiom is also sensible from a compromise perspective, but perhaps more open to
qualification. It makes sense to posit, as done by the axiom, that the aggregate burden of compromise
is minimized iff it is minimized component-by-component. The Combination axiom rules out, however,
distributional considerations which would take into account whether it is the same individuals bearing
much of the “burden of compromise” in each instance, or whether that burden is distributed more equally
over component problems.
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(a) Any additive majority rule satisfies Supermajority efficiency, Combination and Scale
invariance on 〈E〉.
Now let F be a judgement aggregation rule satisfying Combination on 〈E〉. Also suppose
that either (i) E is a rationally-weighted environment, or (ii) E is minimally rich, and F
satisfies Scale invariance. Then:
(b) F satisfies Supermajority efficiency on ∆〈E〉 if and only if F is covered by an
additive majority rule G.
Now, in addition to the previous assumptions, suppose F is SME and total on 〈E〉. Then:
(c) For all C ∈ 〈E〉, there is a dense open subset O ⊆ ∆(C) such that F (C, µ) =
G(C;µ) and is single-valued for all µ ∈ O.
(d) F admits a unique minimal cover in the class of additive majority rules.
Theorem 1 is a multi-faceted statement. To distill its gist, consider the special case of the
environment E = 〈{C}〉 generated by a single rationally weighted judgement context C. If
F is any judgement aggregation rule on C, then there exists a unique extension of F to a
judgement aggregation rule F ∗ on the environment 〈{C}〉 that satisfies Combination. This
yields the following consequence of Theorem 1.
Corollary 5.1 Let F be a judgement aggregation rule on a rationally-weighted context C.
Then F is covered by an additive majority rule if and only if F ∗ satisfies Supermajority
efficiency on 〈{C}〉.
The Combination axiom is an interprofile condition. As such, it is very transparent, even
plain, and compatible with many different JA rules. At the same time, as Theorem 1 and
Corollary 5.1 show, it is quite potent in conjunction with Supermajority Efficiency. This is
possible because application of Supermajority Efficiency to composite judgement contexts
entails substantial additional restrictions beyond the application of Supermajority Efficiency
to the constituent judgement contexts.
To illustrate how this happens, consider the Monotonicity condition satisfied by all
AMRs, as shown by Proposition 4.4. Monotonicity is a basic, intrinsically appealing,
cross-profile restriction on judgement aggregation rules that is evidently not entailed by
Supermajority Efficiency alone. Arguing by way of contradiction, consider any context
C =(K,λ,X ,Y) and profiles µ, µ′ ∈ ∆ (Y) witnessing a violation of monotonicity. That is,
assume that while µ′ is more supportive of some x than µ is (as defined above in Section
4), x ∈ F (µ) but x /∈ F (µ′), and say y ∈ F (µ′). Consider the combined context Ĉ = C×C
and a profile µ̂ with marginals µ̂(1) = µ and µ̂(2) = µ′, respectively. By Combination,
(x,y) ∈ F (Ĉ, µ̂). But (x,y) is supermajority-dominated in (Ĉ, µ̂) by (y,x), as follows
easily from the fact that (µ′ − µ)k · (xk − yk) > 0 for all k ∈ K such that xk 6= yk, by
hypothesis. So F must be monotone after all.
The Monotonicity condition illustrates the bite of Combination for a single context. By
applying Supermajority Efficiency and Combination across different contexts, we also ensure
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that the supermajority tradeoffs are are made in a uniform way across all contexts, being
governed by the same gain function φ throughout.24
5.1 Continuity
Theorem 1 is slightly unsatisfactory as its representation by AMRs is an inclusion rather
than an equality. That gap can be closed if F is assumed to be continuous and total. A
judgement aggregation rule F : ∆(Y)⇒ X is continuous if, for every µ ∈ ∆(Y), one of the
following two equivalent statements is true:
(Cont1) There exists some  > 0 such that, for any  ∈ (0, ) any other ν ∈ ∆(Y), we
have F ( ν + (1− )µ) ⊆ F (µ).
(Cont2) For every sequence {µn}∞n=1 ⊂ ∆(Y), and every x ∈ X , if lim
n→∞
µn = µ, and
x ∈ F (µn) for all n ∈ N, then x ∈ F (µ).
Statement (Cont1) is sometimes described as the “overwhelming majority” property. Heuris-
tically, the profile  ν + (1− )µ represents a mixture of two populations: a small minority
described by the profile ν, and a large majority represented by the profile µ. Statement
(Cont1) says that, if the majority is large enough, then its view determines the group view
(except that the minority can perhaps act as a tie-breaker in some cases). The equivalent
statement (Cont2) is a standard upper hemicontinuity property.
Theorem 2 Let F be a total and continuous aggregation rule on an environment 〈E〉 sat-
isfying either condition (i) or condition (ii) of Theorem 1. Then F is an additive majority
rule if and only if F satisfies Supermajority efficiency and Combination.
Let C be a judgement context, and let F be a judgement aggregation rule on C. If C is
rationally weighted, then we define 〈C〉 := 〈{C}〉; in this cases, as we already noted prior
to Corollary 5.1, there is a unique extension of F to a judgement aggregation rule F ∗ on
〈C〉 that satisfies Combination. On the other hand, if C is not rationally weighted, then we
define 〈C〉 := 〈{r C; r ∈ R+}〉; in this cases, there is a unique extension of F to a rule F ∗
on 〈C〉 that satisfies both Combination and Scale invariance. We can now state the following
enhancement of Corollary 5.1.
Corollary 5.2 Let F be a continuous judgement aggregation rule on C. Then F ∗ satisfies
Supermajority efficiency on 〈C〉 if and only if F is an additive majority rule.
While Theorem 2 delivers an exact representation of continuous JA rules as AMRs, it
remain silent on when an AMR is continuous. A straightforward sufficient condition is the
real-valuedness and continuity of the gain function.
24 We have stated the axiom of Combination in terms of arbitrary profiles in ∆(Y1 × · · · × YJ). But to
obtain the conclusions of Theorem 1, we only need Combination to hold for profiles of the form µ1×· · ·×µJ ,
where µj ∈ ∆(Yj) for all j ∈ [1 . . . J ]. (This sort of “Cartesian product” could arise in a profile involving
J disjoint populations of voters, for example.) We opted for the stronger forms of Combination, because it
remains applicable in the finite population case as well.
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Proposition 5.3 Let φ : [−1, 1]−→R be any continuous, real-valued gain function. Then
for every judgement context C, the rule Fφ is continuous on ∆(C).
Following Myerson (1995), one might hope to obtain a converse to Proposition 5.3,
and thereby to turn Theorem 1 into a full characterization of continuous AMR. But one
can show by example that the converse is false. Indeed, continuity of an AMR does not
even ensure representability by a real-valued gain function. So, the characterization of
AMRs that are continuous, of AMRs that have a real-valued representation, and of AMRs
that have a continuous, real-valued representation are all open problems. The difficulty
in obtaining a real-valued representation also explains why it was necessary to go the
hyperreal route rather than try to obtain a real-valued representation via a more standard
argument from infinite-dimensional analysis.25
5.2 Restricted Domains; Finite Populations
The central assertion of Theorem 1 is part (b): the characterization of SME in terms of
the existence of a covering AMR. Note that this does not require the rule to be total, i.e.
non-empty everywhere. (Indeed, the assertion is trivially true of the “null” correspondence
that selects the empty set everywhere.) This feature lends additional versatility to result.
For example, Theorem 1(b) holds also when the assumption that X ⊆ Y is dropped.
This can capture restrictions on admissible input judgements that are not imposed on
output judgements. For instance, in the context of aggregating rankings, the input rankings
may have certain structure (e.g. for reasons of informational parsimony). At the same time,
one might be satisfied with any (transitive and complete) ranking as an admissible output.
The insensitivity of our main result to the scope of the domain of is quite unusual in social
choice theory.26
In similar manner, Theorem 1 also applies to fixed finite populations of size N , as shown
in the following result. Assuming anonymity, for a given input space Y , let ∆N (Y) denote
the possible judgement profiles among N equally weighted voters,27 and define ∆N (〈E〉)
analogously.
Theorem 3 Let E be a finite, rationally weighted judgement environment, and let N be
a positive integer. Let F be an aggregation rule on the finite population domain ∆N (〈E〉)
satisfying Combination. Then F satisfies Supermajority efficiency if and only if it is covered
by an additive majority rule G. If F is total, it admits a unique minimal cover. Finally,
any additive majority rule on ∆N (〈E〉) can be represented by an additive majority rule
with a real-valued gain function.
25With an infinite-dimensional separating hyerplane argument analogous to the one used in the proofs
of Theorems C.1 and C.2 in Appendix C, we can construct a function φ : [−1, 1]−→R such that Fφ covers
F . However, in general, this φ will not be strictly increasing, so Fφ will not, in general, be SME itself.
Indeed, in extreme cases (e.g. F = Leximin), φ may be constant on almost all of [−1, 1], so this cover will
be so coarse as to be useless. Note that this observation also underlines the key role of strict monotonicity
of φ for generic single-valuedness shown in Proposition 4.4.
26It contrasts, for example, with the reliance on large, if not unrestricted, domains in results such as
Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem and the characterization of positonal scoring rules due to Young (1975).
27Formally, ∆N (Y) = {µ ∈ ∆(Y); for all y ∈ Y, µ(y) = m/N for some m ∈ [0 . . .M ]}.
23
The proof of our main result (Theorem 1) begins by proving a version of Theorem 3 for
a fixed, finite population of weighted voters (Theorem C.1). We also obtain a version of
Theorem 3 for infinite, non-rationally weighted judgement environments (Theorem C.2),
but it is more complicated to state. We then patch together the real-valued representations
obtained via Theorems C.1 and C.2 for every possible finitely-based subdomain, to obtain
one overarching representation with a common gain function. This common gain function
is hyperreal-valued because it is obtained from an ultrapower construction; see Appendix
A for details.
Indeed, the need for hyperreal numbers already arises if one wants to deal with the
variable-population domain
⋃
N∈N ∆N (E) , which is the domain of all rational-valued pro-
files. For example, consider the Leximin rule. By the concluding statement of Theorem
3, for any N ∈ N, Leximin is covered on ∆N (〈E〉) by an AMR with a real-valued gain
function. Indeed, it is easy to check that Leximin = HdN on ∆N (E) for dN sufficiently
large. But as N → ∞, this dN must increase without bounds. Hence, there is no d ∈ R
such that Leximin = Hd on
⋃
N∈N ∆N (E). Indeed, there is no real-valued gain function φ
such that Leximin = Fφ on ∆N (E) for all N ∈ N. However, if ω is an infinite hyperreal
number, then Hω is well-defined and equal to Leximin. (For the proofs of these statements,
see Proposition F.1 in Appendix F.)
Conclusion
In this paper, we have characterized majoritarian judgement aggregation in terms of the
family of additive majority rules. We have provided a representation theorem with two
types of free parameters: the issue weights and the gain function. But we have not said
much about how these free parameters should be determined.
As to issue weights, symmetries of the judgment context are often suggestive of sym-
metry of the weights; can one provide a formally explicit account of when such arguments
are cogent? Also, we have assumed that issue weights are given. When is this assumption
sensible? In special cases, one may attempt to obtain the issue weights themselves from a
representation result, but in general, that seems to be too much to ask for.
Likewise, are there further normative considerations that could pin down a particular
gain function, or a subset of them? We believe that there are such considerations, but
that they do not all pull in one direction; substantial work remains to be done. A central
place in these investigations will surely be played by the rule associated with any linear
gain function —namely the median rule. A normative, axiomatic foundation of this rule
is provided in the companion paper (Nehring and Pivato, 2018).
Appendices
A Hyperreal fields
In basic mathematics, infinity is a “nonarithmetic” object, and the word “infinitesimal” is
merely a figure of speech. But it is possible to construct a well-defined and well-behaved
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arithmetic of infinite and infinitesimal quantities, using a hyperreal field. Roughly speaking,
this is is an arithmetic structure ∗R which is obtained by adding “infinite” and “infinitesi-
mal” quantities to the set of real numbers. The important properties of ∗R are as follows:
1. ∗R is a field. This means that ∗R has binary operations “+” and “·”, and distinguished
“identity” elements 0 and 1 such that:
(a) (∗R,+, 0) is an abelian group, and (∗R \ {0}, ·, 1) is an abelian group.
(b) For all r, s, t ∈ ∗R, we have r · (s+ t) = r · s+ r · t.
2. There is an “exponentiation” operation, which behaves as one would expect: for all
r, s, t ∈ ∗R, we have r0 = 1, r1 = r, r−1 = 1/r, rs+t = rs · rt, and (r · s)t = rt · st.
3. ∗R has a linear order relation > (i.e. > is transitive, complete, and antisymmetric).
4. For any r, s ∈ ∗R, if r > 0, then r + s > s. If r > 1, and s > 0, then r · s > s.
5. R ⊂ ∗R. The arithmetic and ordering on ∗R extend the arithmetic and ordering of R.
The field ∗R is the subject of of nonstandard analysis (Goldblatt, 1998). It inherits many
of the properties of R, but not all. For example, because it contains infinite quantities,
∗R violates the Archimedean property of the real numbers, which states that the ratio of
any two non-zero elements is finite. But this non-Archimidean aspect is crucial to allow
representation of AMRs with lexical features such as the Leximin rule and SME refinements
of the Slater rule. Also, because ∗R contains infinitesimals, it is not order-complete: in
general, infinite subsets of ∗R need not have well-defined suprema and infima. Thus, much
of the machinery of classical real analysis breaks down in ∗R. The order topology of ∗R is
not well-behaved; there are no nontrivial continuous functions from R into ∗R. While these
features create difficulties in asserting and proving some statements, they do not affect the
use of hyperreal numbers in the calculus of additive majority rules since the sets involved
there are always finite (at least as long as the number of issues is finite, as assumed here.)
So our use of hyperreals stays elementary throughout. The only “non-elementary”
argument is the ultra-power construction which appeals to the Axiom of Choice. No
knowledge of nonstandard analysis is required.
Ultrapower construction. The properties listed above are sufficient for a casual user
of ∗R. However, we will now also provide a formal construction of ∗R, that is central to the
proof of the main result of the paper, Theorem 1. Let I be any infinite indexing set. A
free filter on I is a collection F of subsets of I satisfying the following axioms:
(F0) No finite subset of I is an element of F. (In particular, ∅ 6∈ F.)
(F1) If E ,F ∈ F, then E ∩ F ∈ F.
(F2) For any F ∈ F and E ⊆ I, if F ⊆ E , then E ∈ F also.
For any E ⊆ I, axioms (F0) and (F1) together imply that at most one of E or E{ := I \ E
can be in F. A free ultrafilter is filter U which also satisfies:
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(UF) For any E ⊆ I, either E ∈ U or E{ ∈ U.
Equivalently, a free ultrafilter is a maximal free filter: it is not a proper subset of any other
free filter. Heuristically, elements of U are “large” subsets of I: if J ∈ U and a certain
statement holds for all j ∈ J , then this statement holds for “almost all” element of I. In
particular, axioms (F0) and (UF) imply that I ∈ U.
Ultrafilter lemma. Every free filter F is contained in some free ultrafilter.
Proof sketch. Consider the set of all free filters containing F; apply Zorn’s Lemma to get
a maximal element of this set. 2
Let U be a free ultrafilter on I, and let RI be the space of all functions r : I−→R. For all
r, s ∈ RI , define r ≈
U
s if the set {i ∈ I; r(i) = s(i)} is an element of U. Let ∗R := RI/(≈
U
).





the set {i ∈ I; r(i) > s(i)} is an element of U
)
. (A1)
This defines a linear order “>” on ∗R. Define the elements r + s, r · s, r/s, and rs in RI
by: (r + s)i := ri+si, (r · s)i := ri ·si, (r/s)i := ri/si, and (rs)i := rsii , for all i ∈ I. Then,
define ∗r + ∗s := ∗(r + s), ∗r · ∗s := ∗(r · s), ∗r/∗s := ∗(r/s), and ∗r∗s := ∗(rs). We embed R
into ∗R by mapping each r ∈ R to the element ∗r in ∗R, where r := (r, r, r, . . .) ∈ RI . Then
(∗R,+, ·, >) is called an ultrapower of R; it is a hyperreal field in the sense defined above.
B Proofs from Section 4
Notation. For any x,y ∈ {±1}K, we define K(x,y) := {k ∈ K ; xk 6= yk}.
Proof of Proposition 4.2. (a) Let C = (K,λ,X ,Y). Define φ̂(r) := φ(r)− φ(−r) for




















































Here (∗) is because yk = −xk for all k ∈ K(x,y). Meanwhile (†) is simply the definition
of φ̂, and (‡) is because φ̂ is odd, so φ̂(r)− φ̂(−r) = 2φ̂(r).
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This holds for all x,y ∈ X . Thus, Fφ(C;µ) = Fφ̂(C;µ). 2
Proof of Proposition 4.3. (a) The second equality follows immediately from the
first, because xkµ˜k > 0 if and only if k ∈ M(x, µ). To see the first equality, define
ψ(r) := φ(r+) for all r ∈ [−1, 1]. Then φ(r) = ψ(r)− ψ(−r) for all r ∈ [−1, 1] (because
φ is odd). Thus, in the notation of Proposition 4.2, we have φ = ψ̂. Thus, Fφ = Fψ.
(Strictly speaking, ψ is only non-decreasing, rather than strictly increasing. But the
proof of Proposition 4.2 still works.)
(b) If φ is odd, then for any µ ∈ ∆(Y), x ∈ X , and k ∈ K, we have φ(xkµ˜k) = xkφ(µ˜k)
(because xk = ±1). Thus,
∑
k∈K
λk φ(xk · µ˜k) =
∑
k∈K












Lemma B.1 Let C = (K,λ,X ,Y) be a judgement context, and let F : ∆(Y) ⇒ X be an
aggregation rule. If F is monotone and total, then F is generically single-valued on ∆(Y).
Proof: Define ∆∗(Y) := {µ ∈ ∆(Y); µ(y) > 0 for all y ∈ Y} (a dense subset of ∆(Y)).
For any µ ∈ ∆∗(Y) and any x ∈ F (µ), define Ox(µ) := {µ′ ∈ ∆(Y); µ′(x) > µ(x) while
µ′(y) < µ(y), for all y ∈ Y \ {x}}. Then Ox(µ) 6= ∅ (because µ ∈ ∆∗(Y)), and Ox(µ) is
an open subset of ∆(Y), and µ is a cluster point of Ox(µ). Furthermore, F (µ′) = {x}
for all µ′ ∈ Ox(µ) (because F is monotone). Thus, F is single-valued on Ox(µ).
Next, for any µ ∈ ∆∗(Y), define O(µ) :=
⋃
y∈F (µ)
Oy(µ). Then O(µ) is a nonempty
open subset of ∆(Y), and µ is a cluster point of O(µ) (because it is a union of one or




Then O is an open subset of ∆(Y), and F is single-valued on O. Every element of ∆∗(Y)
is a cluster point of O, and ∆∗(Y) is dense in ∆(Y); thus, O is dense in ∆(Y). 2
Proof of Proposition 4.4 (a) Suppose C = (K,λ,X ,Y). Let µ ∈ ∆(Y) and x ∈ Fφ(µ).
Let µ′ ∈ ∆(Y) be more supportive than µ of x; we must show that Fφ(µ′) = {x}. By
negating certain coordinates of X if necessary, we can assume without loss of generality
that x = 1. Recall that Y(µ) := {y ∈ Y ; µ(y) > 0}. Thus, Y(µ′) ⊆ Y(µ) (because
µ′ is more supportive of x). Define K1 := {k ∈ K; µ˜k = 1} = {k ∈ K; yk = 1 for all
y ∈ Y(µ)}. Let K0 := K \ K1.
Claim 1: (a) For all k ∈ K, we have µ˜′k ≥ µ˜k. (b) If k ∈ K0 then µ˜′k > µ˜k.
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Proof: (a) If µ′ is more supportive than µ of x, then Y(µ′) ⊆ Y(µ). Let Y− := {y ∈ Y(µ);
yk = −1} and Y+ := {y ∈ Y(µ); y 6= x but yk = 1}. Then for all k ∈ K, we have































































= 1− 1 = 0,
and thus, µ˜′k ≥ µ˜k. Here, () is by defining equation (4.1), and the fact that Y(µ′) ⊆
Y(µ). Meanwhile, (†) is by definition of Y− and Y+, and (∗) is because µ′(y)−µ(y) < 0
for all y ∈ Y− by the hypothesis on µ′.
(b) If k ∈ K0, then Y− 6= ∅, so (∗) becomes a strict inequality, so µ˜′k > µ˜k. 3 Claim 1
Now, let y ∈ X \ {x}; we will show that y 6∈ F (µ′). There are two cases.
Case 1. Suppose K(x,y) ⊆ K1. Then for all k ∈ K(x,y), we have µ˜k = xk = 1, while






λk (xk − yk)φ(µ˜k) = 2 d(x,y) · φ(1) > 0.
Thus, x •
λ
φ(µ˜) > y •
λ
φ(µ˜), so y 6∈ Fφ(µ).
Case 2. Suppose K(x,y) 6⊆ K1. For all k ∈ K(x,y), we have xk = 1 and yk = −1,
while Claim 1(a) says µ˜′k ≥ µ˜k. Furthermore, K0 ∩ K(x,y) 6= ∅, and for any k ∈












λk 2φ(µ˜k) = (x− y) •λ φ(µ˜) ≥
(∗)
0,
and thus, y 6∈ Fφ(µ′). Here, () is because φ is strictly increasing, and (∗) is because
x ∈ Fφ(µ). We conclude that y 6∈ Fφ(µ′) for all y ∈ X \ {x}; thus, F (µ˜′) = {x}, as
desired.
(b) follows immediately from part (a) and Lemma B.1, because any additive majority rule
is total. 2
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C Preparatory results for Section 5
Theorem 3 is a special case of a more general result, which is in fact a preliminary step in
the proof of Theorem 1(b,c,d). To state it, we need some notation.
As explained in Section 3, a profile µ in ∆(Y) represents a population of weighted
voters. To be precise, let N be a finite set of voters, and let ω : N−→R+ be a “weight
function” (reflecting, e.g. the differing expertise or standing of different voters). For all





{ω(n) ; n ∈ N and xn = y}, for all y ∈ Y , (C1)
where W :=
∑
n∈N ω(n). This function summarizes the voters’ views, but renders them
anonymous (except for their differing weights).
Now, let ℘[0, 1] be the set of all finite subsets of [0, 1]. For any H ∈ ℘[0, 1], we define
∆H(Y) := {µ ∈ ∆(Y); |µ˜k| ∈ H for all k ∈ K}. For example, suppose H = {mN ;
m ∈ [0 . . . N ]}; then ∆H(Y) is contains all profiles which can be constructed using exactly
N equally weighted voters. More generally, let N be a finite set of voters, let ω : N−→R+
be a weight function, and let ∆ω(Y) be the set of all profiles in ∆(Y) obtained by using ω
in equation (C1). Let H to be the set of all elements of [0, 1] which can be written in the
form
∑
n∈N xn ω(n) for some x ∈ {±1}K; then ∆ω(Y) ⊆ ∆H(Y).
If E is a judgement environment and H ∈ ℘[0, 1], then we define ∆H(E) to be the
set of all judgement probems (C, µ) where C ∈ E and µ ∈ ∆H(C). For any judgement
environment G, we define 〈G〉 as in formula (5.1).
Theorem C.1 Let G be a finite, rationally weighted judgement environment, let H ∈
℘[0, 1], and let F be a judgement aggregation rule on ∆H〈G〉 which satisfies Combination.
(a) F satisfies Supermajority efficiency on ∆H〈G〉 if and only if there is a gain function
φH : H−→R such that F (C;µ) ⊆ FφH(C;µ) for all C ∈ 〈G〉 and µ ∈ ∆H(C).
(b) If F is also total, then F has a unique minimal covering on ∆H〈G〉 amongst all
additive majority rules.28
(c) Any additive majority rule G on ∆H〈G〉 has a real-valued representation.
Theorem C.1 only applies to rationally weighted judgement environments. We will also
need a variant of Theorem C.1 for real-weighted judgement environments. A (real-weighted)
judgement environment E is finitely generated if there is a finite subset G ⊆ E such that:
(FG1) If C1,C2 ∈ E, then C1 × C2 ∈ E also.
(FG2) For all C ∈ E, we have C = r1G1× · · ·× rJGJ for some J ∈ N, G1, ...,GJ ∈ G, and
r1, ..., rJ ∈ R+.
(FG3) For all G ∈ G, there is some  > 0 such that rG ∈ E for all r ∈ R with 1 −  <
r < 1 + .
28However, the gain function which defines the minimal covering rule is not unique.
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In the notation introduced in formula (5.1), condition (FG1) says that E = 〈E〉. If we define
G′ = {rG; G ∈ G and r ∈ R+}, then condition (FG2) says that E ⊆ 〈G′〉. Finally, condition
(FG3) is just the property of minimal richness defined prior to Axiom 3. Note that we can
use the same  for all G in G, because G is finite. For example, let G be a finite collection
of judgement contexts, let 0 < r < 1 < r ≤ ∞, and define 〈G, r, r〉 := {r1 G1×· · ·×rN GN ;
N ∈ N, r < r1, . . . , rN < r and G1, . . . ,GN ∈ G}; then 〈G, r, r〉 is a finitely generated
judgement environment.
Theorem C.2 Let H ∈ ℘[0, 1], let E be a finitely generated judgement environment, and
let F be a judgement aggregation rule on ∆H(E) which satisfies Combination and Scale
invariance. Then the statements of Theorem C.1(a,b,c) are true if we replace every instance
of “〈G〉” with “E”.
The advantage of Theorem C.2 over Theorem C.1 is that Theorem C.2 applies any judge-
ment context (as long as it is finitely generated), whereas Theorem C.1 only applies to
finite, rationally-weighted contexts. By contrast, the advantage of Theorem C.1 over The-
orem C.2 is that Theorem C.1 does not require G to satisfy the richness condition (FG3).
It also does not require F to satisfy Scale invariance. Surprisingly, for rationally-weighted
judgement contexts, the axioms of Supermajority Efficiency and Combination alone are suf-
ficient to yield a covering by an additive majority rule.
For the rest of this appendix, let H, E and F be as in Theorem C.2. Sometimes, we will
use the symbol P to represent “either Q or R”.29 For any J ∈ N, let ∆JP := {(p1, . . . , pJ) ∈
PJ+; p1 + · · · + pJ = 1}. For any subset V ⊆ RH, let convP(V) denote the P-convex hull
of V . Formally, convP(V) := {
∑J
j=1 pj vj; J ∈ N, v1, . . . ,vJ ∈ V , and (p1, . . . , pJ) ∈ ∆JP}.
Clearly, convP(V) ⊂ RH. Furthermore, if V ⊂ PH, then convP(V) ⊂ PH. Let RH+ be the
non-negative orthant in RH, while RH++ is the strictly positive orthant in RH. Formally,
RH+ := {r ∈ RH; rh ≥ 0 for all h ∈ H} and RH++ := {r ∈ RH; rh > 0 for all h ∈ H}.
The proof of Theorems C.1 and C.2 occupies the rest of the appendix, and involves seven
preliminary lemmas. The first one strengthens a well-known result about Pareto optima
in convex sets.
Lemma C.1 Let P = Q or R. Let V ⊆ PH be a finite set, let P := convP(V), and let
P := conv(V). If P ∩ RH+ = {0}, then there exists z ∈ RH++ such that z • p ≤ 0 for all
p ∈ P.
Proof:
Claim 1: If P ∩ RH+ = {0}, then P ∩ RH+ = {0}.
Proof: (by contrapositive) Clearly, 0 ∈ P ∩RH+ because 0 ∈ P ∩RH+ . Suppose P ∩RH+ 6=
{0}; we will show that P ∩ RH+ 6= {0} also.
29In fact, for all the proofs in this appendix —including the proof of Theorem C.2 —we could replace
R with an arbitrary subfield of R. In this case, P can be taken to represent this subfield. However, this
additional level of generality is not necessary for the proofs of Theorem 1, 2, or 3, so we have not made it
explicit in this appendix.
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Let p ∈ P ∩RH+ be nonzero. Then ph ≥ 0 for all h ∈ H, and pk > 0 for some k ∈ H.
Suppose V = {v1, . . . ,vJ}, where vj = (vj1, . . . , vjH) for all j ∈ [1 . . . J ]. Consider the






k over all (r1, . . . , rJ) ∈ RJ , (C2)
subject to rj ≥ 0, for all j ∈ [1 . . . J ]; (C3)
J∑
j=1






h ≥ 0, for all h ∈ H. (C5)
Since p ∈ P , we know that p = ∑Jj=1 rj vj for some r = (r1, . . . , rJ) ∈ ∆J —
equivalently, some r ∈ RJ satisfying the constraints (C3) and (C4). But p ∈ RH+ ,
so r also satisfies constraint (C5). Finally, pk > 0, so the optimal value of objective
function (C2) is strictly positive.
Now, suppose we solve the linear program (C2)-(C5) using the Simplex Method.
Note that the objective function (C2) and the constraints (C3)-(C5) are all P-linear.
Thus, the output of the Simplex Method will also be P-linear (because each pivot
operation converts P-valued input into P-valued output). Thus, we obtain an optimal
solution s ∈ PH. Let q = ∑Jj=1 sj vj. Constraints (C3)-(C4) imply that s ∈ ∆JP ; thus
q ∈ P . Meanwhile, constraint (C5) says that q ∈ RH+ . Finally, qk ≥ pk > 0; thus,
q 6= 0, as claimed. 3 Claim 1
Note that P is a compact, convex polyhedron in RH. Let T := P − RH+ ; then T is also
a closed, convex polyhedron in RH.
Claim 2: T ∩ RH+ = {0}.
Proof: (by contradiction) If t ∈ T , then t = p − r for some p ∈ P and r ∈ RH+ . Thus
p = t + r. Thus, if t ∈ RH+ \ {0}, then p ∈ RH+ \ {0} also, contradicting Claim 1.
3 Claim 2
Thus, 0 lies on the boundary of the polyhedron T , so it is contained in some face. Let F
be the minimal-dimension face of T containing 0. Thus, if S ⊆ RH is the linear subspace
spanned by F , then F = S ∩ T , and there exists some  > 0 such that B ∩ S ⊂ F ,
where B ⊂ RH is the -ball around 0.
F is a face of T , so there exists some z ∈ RK such that F = argmaxt∈T (z•t). Clearly
z • 0 = 0; hence z • f = 0 for all f ∈ F , while z • t < 0 for all t ∈ T \ F . Thus, if
W ⊂ RH is the hyperplane orthogonal to z, then F = T ∩W .
Claim 3: z • r > 0 for all r ∈ RH+ \ {0}.
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Proof: For any r ∈ RH+ \ {0}, we have −r ∈ T , so z • (−r) ≤ 0, so z • r ≥ 0. It remains
to show that z • r 6= 0. By contradiction, suppose z • r = 0. Then r ∈ W . Thus,
−r ∈ W . But −r ∈ T also, so −r ∈ T ∩W = F = T ∩ S. But F contains a relative
neighbourhood around 0 in the subspace S, so if −r ∈ F , then there exists some  > 0
such that  r ∈ F ; hence  r ∈ T . But  r ∈ RH+ \ {0}, so this contradicts Claim 2.
3 Claim 3
For any h ∈ H, let eh = (0, 0, . . . , 0, 1, 0, . . . , 0) be the hth unit vector. Then eh ∈ RH+ .
Thus, Claim 3 says that z • eh > 0. Thus, zh > 0, as desired. 2
Let P = Q or R, and let C = (K,λ,X ,Y) be a P-weighted judgement context. For
notational convenience, we define |C| := |K|. Let x ∈ X and let µ ∈ ∆H(Y), and define
γλµ,x : [0, 1]−→R+ as in formula (4.2). Note that γλµ,x(q) ∈ P+ for all q ∈ [0, 1] (because
P is closed under addition). Furthermore, γλµ,x is constant on any subinterval of [0, 1] not
containing an element of H (by definition of ∆H(Y)). Thus, a complete description of γλµ,x
is encoded in the |H|-dimensional vector g(x,C, µ) ∈ PH defined by setting








λk, for all h ∈ H. (C6)
Let DH(x;C, µ) := {g(y,C, µ) − g(x,C, µ); y ∈ X}, a finite subset of PH. (Note that






DH(x;C, µ) ⊆ PH. (C7)
Finally, let E be a P-weighted judgement environment, and let F be a judgement aggrega-




DH(F,C) ⊆ PH. (C8)
Note that 0 ∈ DH(F,E), because 0 ∈ DH(x;µ) for any choice of x and µ. The next lemma
shows how the supermajority efficiency of the rule F implies that DH(F,E) satisfies the
key hypothesis of Lemma C.1.
Lemma C.2 F satisfies Supermajority efficiency on ∆H(E) if and only if DH(F,E)∩RH+ =
{0}.
Proof: For any C = (K,λ,X ,Y) in E, any µ ∈ ∆H(Y), and any x ∈ X , we have(
















Thus, F satisfies Supermajority efficiency on ∆H(E) if and only if DH(x,C, µ)∩RH+ = {0}
whenever x ∈ F (C, µ) for some (C;µ) ∈ ∆H(E). The claim now follows from defining
formulae (C7) and (C8). 2
Suppose E is a finitely generated judgement context, generated by some finite subsetG ⊂ E.
Condition (FG3) implies that there is some  = (E) > 0 such that
r C ∈ E for all C ∈ G and all r ∈ (1− , 1 + ). (C9)
For any N ∈ N, and any K1, . . . , KN ∈ N, we define
P(K1, ..., KN) :=
{










Thus, if K :=
∑N
n=1 Kn and qn := Kn/K for all n ∈ [1 . . . N ], then for any (p1, . . . , pN) ∈
P(K1, . . . , KN), we have q1 p1 + · · ·+ qN pN = 1, so that (q1 p1, . . . , qN pN) ∈ ∆NP . Let 1 :=
(1, 1, . . . , 1); then 1 ∈ P(K1, . . . , KN), and P(K1, . . . , KN) can be visualized as a small
neighbourhood of 1 in the affine hyperplane of PN orthogonal to the vector (q1, . . . , qN).
Now let
〈G, 〉 := {p1C1 × · · · × pNCN ; N ∈ N, C1, ...,CN ∈ G and (p1, ..., pN) ∈ P(|C1|, ..., |CN |)}.
(C11)
Then conditions (FG1) and (FG3) together imply that 〈G, 〉 ⊆ E. Thus, if F is a
judgement aggregation rule on ∆H(E), then F is well-defined on ∆H〈G, 〉. Note that
〈G〉 ⊆ 〈G, 〉, where 〈G〉 is defined as in formula (5.1). The next lemma shows how the
Q-convexity of DH(F, 〈G〉) arises from the axiom of Combination, while the R-convexity of
DH(F, 〈G, 〉) arises from Combination and Scale invariance.
Lemma C.3 Suppose G = {C1, . . . ,CJ}, and let V := DH(F,C1)∪· · ·∪DH(F,CJ). Then:
(a) V is finite.
(b) If F satisfies Combination on ∆H〈G〉, then DH(F, 〈G〉) = convQ(V).
(c) If F satisfies Combination and Scale invariance on ∆H〈G, 〉, then DH(F, 〈G, 〉) =
conv(V).
The proof of Lemma C.3 depends on another lemma.
Lemma C.4 (a) Let G be a Q-weighted judgement environment. If F satisfies Com-
bination on ∆H〈G〉, then for all J ∈ N and all C1, . . . ,CJ ∈ 〈G〉,
DH(F,C1 × · · · × CJ) =
{
q1 d
1 + · · ·+ qJ dJ ; dj ∈ DH(F,Cj) for all j ∈ [1 . . . J ]
}
.
where qj := |Cj|/|C| for all j ∈ [1 . . . J ].
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(b) Let P = Q or R, and let E be a P-weighted judgement environment. If F satisfies
Combination and Scale invariance on ∆H(E), then for all J ∈ N, all C1, . . . ,CJ ∈ E
and all (p1, . . . , pJ) ∈ PJ+, if p1 C1 × · · · × pJ CJ ∈ E, then
DH(F, p1 C1×· · ·×pJ CJ) =
{
q1 p1 d
1 + · · ·+ qJ pJ dJ ; dj ∈ DH(F,Cj) for all j ∈ [1 . . . J ]
}
.
where qj := |Cj|/|C| for all j ∈ [1 . . . J ].
Proof: Part (a) follows from part (b) in the special case when P = Q and p1 = · · · = pJ = 1.
So it suffices to prove the more general part (b), and observe that, when p1 = · · · = pJ =
1, the following proof does not require F to satisfy Scale invariance; it only requires F
to satisfy Combination on 〈G〉.









Claim 1: Let C1 = (K1,λ1,X 1,Y1) and C2 = (K2,λ2,X 2,Y2) be two judgement
contexts in E, let (p1, p2) ∈ P2+, and let p1C1 × p2C2 = (K,λ,X ,Y). (So K = K1 unionsq K2,
X = X 1 ×X 2, Y = Y1 × Y2, and λ = (p1λ1, p2λ2).) Suppose p1C1 × p2C2 ∈ E. Then
(a) For any µ1 ∈ ∆H(Y1) and µ2 ∈ ∆H(Y2), there exists a profile µ ∈ ∆H(Y) such that
µ(1) = µ1 and µ
(2) = µ2, where these marginals are defined as in equation (5.3).
(b) Let q1 := |K1|/|K| and q2 := |K2|/|K|. Then for any x = (x1,x2) ∈ X , we have
g(x,C, µ) = q1 p1 g(x1,C1, µ(1)) + q2 p2 g(x2,C2, µ(2)).
(c) DH(F,C, µ) = {q1 p1 d1 +q2 p2 d2; d1 ∈ DH(F,C1, µ(1)) and d2 ∈ DH(F,C2, µ(2))}.
(d) DH(F,C) = {q1 p1 d1 + q2 p2 d2; d1 ∈ DH(F,C1) and d2 ∈ DH(F,C2}.
Proof: (a) Let µ := µ1 ⊗ µ2 —in other words, µ(x1,x2) = µ1(x1) · µ2(x2), for any












where (∗) is by equation (5.3). Thus, µ(1) = µ1. Thus, for any k ∈ K1, we have |µ˜k| =
|(µ˜1)k| ∈ H. Likewise, µ(2) = µ2, and for any k ∈ K2, we have |µ˜k| = |(µ˜2)k| ∈ H.
But K = K1 unionsq K2. Thus, |µ˜k| ∈ H for all k ∈ K, so µ ∈ ∆H(Y), as desired.
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(b) Note that µ˜ = (µ˜(1), µ˜(2)). Thus, for both n ∈ {1, 2} and all k ∈ Kn, we have
xk · µ˜k = xnk · µ˜(n)k . Meanwhile, K = K1 unionsq K2. Thus, for any h ∈ H, we have
{k ∈ K ; xk · µ˜k ≥ h} =
{




k ∈ K2 ; x2k · µ˜(2)k ≥ h
}
.































k ; k ∈ K2 and x2k · µ˜(2)k ≥ h
}
(∗) q1 p1 gh(x
1,C1, µ(1)) + q2 p2 gh(x2,C1µ(2)),
as claimed. Here, () is because q1 = |K1|/|K| and q2 = |K2|/|K|, both (∗) are by
equation (C6), while (†) is because λ = (p1λ1, p2λ2).
(c) Let x := (x1,x2) and y := (y1,y2) be elements of X . Thus, x1,y1 ∈ X 1 and x2,y2 ∈
X 2. If d = g(y, µ) − g(x, µ), and dn = g(yn, µ(n)) − g(xn, µ(n)) for n ∈ {1, 2}, then
part (b) implies that
d = g(y, µ)− g(x, µ)
= q1 p1 g(y
1, µ(1))− q1 p1 g(x1, µ(1)) + q2 p2 g(y2, µ(2))− q2 p2 g(x2, µ(2))
= q1 p1 d
1 + q2 p2 d
2. (C14)
But for any d ∈ RH, we have:(









There exist x1 ∈ F (C1, µ(1)), x2 ∈ F (C2, µ(2)), y1 ∈ X 1, and y2 ∈ X 2





∃ d1 ∈ DH(F,X 1, µ(1)) and d2 ∈ DH(F,X 2, µ(2)) such that d = q1 p1d1 + q2 p2d2
)
.
Here (∗) is because X = X 1 ×X 2 and F (C, µ) = F (C1, µ(1))× F (C2, µ(2)), because F
is scale-invariant and satisfies Combination. (Furthermore, note that Scale invariance










1 + q2 p2 d









1 + q2 p2 d





1 + q2 p2 d
2 ; d1 ∈ DH(F,C1) and d2 ∈ DH(F,C2
}
.
Here (∗) is by equation (C13), (†) is by part (c), () is by part (a), and (‡) is by two
more applications of equation (C13). 3 Claim 1
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Now we prove part (b) of the Lemma by induction on J . The case J = 2 follows from
Claim 1(d). So, let J ≥ 3, and suppose the part (b) has been proved for the case J − 1.









Now let C := p1 C1 × · · · × pJ−1 CJ−1 × pJ CJ . Let q′ := |C′|/|C| and let qJ := |CJ |/|C|.
Note that C = C′ × pJ CJ . Thus,
DH(F,C) = DH(F,C′ × pJ CJ) (∗)
{




q′ q′1 p1 d






1 + · · ·+ qJ−1 pJ−1 dJ−1 + qJ pJ dJ ; dj ∈ DH(F,Cj) for all j ∈ [1 . . . J ]
}
,
as claimed. Here, (∗) is by Claim 1(d). Next, (†) is by equation (C15). Finally, () is
because q′ q′j = qj for all j ∈ [1 . . . J − 1]. 2
Proof of Lemma C.3. To show that V is finite, it suffices to show that DH(F,Cj) is finite,
for each j ∈ [1 . . . J ]. Suppose Cj = (Kj,λj,Xj,Yj). The set ∆H(Yj) is finite because
H and Yj are finite sets. Furthermore, for each µ ∈ ∆H(Yj) and x ∈ F (Cj, µ), the
set DH(x,Cj, µ) is finite, because Xj is finite. Thus, defining equation (C7) says that
DH(F,Cj) is a finite union of finite sets, hence finite. This proves part (a). The proofs
of parts (b) and (c) involve four claims. Suppose F satisfies Combination on ∆H〈G〉.
Claim 1: convQ(V) ⊆ DH(F, 〈G〉).
Proof: Let N ∈ N, let (q1, . . . , qN) ∈ ∆NQ , and let v1, . . . ,vN ∈ V ; we must show that
q1 v1 + · · ·+ qN vN ∈ DH(F, 〈G〉).
Let M be a common denominator of q1, . . . , qN , so that for all n ∈ [1 . . . N ] there
is some mn ∈ [0 . . .M ] such that qn = mn/M . (Thus, m1 + · · · + mN = M .) For all
n ∈ [1 . . . N ], find some jn ∈ [1 . . . J ] such that vn ∈ DH(F,Cjn). Let Kn := |Cjn|. Let
H := K1K2 · · ·KN , and for all n ∈ [1 . . . N ], let Hn := H/Kn. Then Hn is an integer
and HnKn = H. For all n ∈ [1 . . . N ], let Ln := mnHn. Finally, let






mnH = M H. (C16)











C := Cj1 × · · · × Cj1︸ ︷︷ ︸
L1
×Cj2 × · · · × Cj2︸ ︷︷ ︸
L2




Then |C| = L1K1 + · · · + LNKN = K. Now, for all n ∈ [1 . . . N ], let d1n, . . . ,dLnn ∈









































Applying (C17), this becomes q1 v1 + · · · + qN vN ∈ DH(F,C). Thus, formula (C8)
yields q1 v1 + · · ·+ qN vN ∈ DH(F, 〈G〉), because C ∈ 〈G〉.
We can perform this construction for any (q1, . . . , qN) ∈ ∆NQ and v1, . . . ,vN ∈ V .
Thus, we conclude that convQ(V) ⊆ DH(F, 〈G〉), as desired. 3 Claim 1
Claim 2: DH(F, 〈G〉) ⊆ convQ(V).










DH(F, Cj1 × · · · × CjN ) ⊆ convQ(V),
as desired. Here (∗) is by formula (C8), and (†) is by formula (5.1). 3 Claim 2
Claims 1 and 2 together yield DH(F, 〈G〉) = convQ(V); this proves part (b).
To prove part (c), suppose F satisfies Combination and Scale invariance on ∆H〈G, 〉.
Claim 3: conv(V) ⊆ DH(F, 〈G, 〉).
Proof: Let N ∈ N, let v1, . . . ,vN ∈ V and let (r1, . . . , rN) ∈ ∆N . We must show that∑N
n=1 rnvn ∈ DH(F, 〈G, 〉). First, note that we can assume without loss of generality
that rn > 0 for all n ∈ [1 . . . N ]. Let r∗ := min{r1, . . . , rN}; then r∗ > 0.
Now, ∆NQ is a dense subset of ∆
N . Thus, there exists some (q1, . . . , qN) ∈ ∆NQ such
that qn > 0 and |qn − rn| < r∗ 2 for all n ∈ [1 . . . N ]. For each n ∈ [1 . . . N ], let
pn := rn/qn. Then pn ∈ R+ (because rn ∈ R+ and qn ∈ Q+ ⊆ R+), and it is easily
verified that
1−  < pn < 1 + , for all n ∈ [1 . . . N ]. (C20)
(Proof sketch: For any n ∈ [1 . . . N ], − r∗ 
2
< rn − qn < r∗ 2 , and thus, 1− r∗ 2 qn < pn <
1 + r∗ 
2 qn
. But qn > rn − r∗2 > rn − r∗2 ≥ r∗ − r∗2 = r∗2 . Thus, r∗ 2 qn < . ) Meanwhile,
q1 p1 + · · ·+ qN pN = r1 + · · ·+ rN = 1. (C21)
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For all n ∈ [1 . . . N ], find jn ∈ [1 . . . J ] such that vn ∈ Cjn . Let Kn := |Cjn|. Now
define M , m1, . . . ,mN , H, H1, . . . , HN , and L1, . . . , LN as in the proof of Claim 1, so






pN KN = p1 L1K1+· · ·+pN LN KN (∗) p1 q1K+· · ·+pN qN K (†) K,
where (∗) is because equation (C17) implies that LnKn = qnK for all n ∈ [1 . . . N ],
and (†) is by equation (C21). Combining this observation with the inequalities (C20),
and comparing to the defining formula (C10), we deduce that
(p1, . . . , p1︸ ︷︷ ︸
L1
, p2, . . . , p2︸ ︷︷ ︸
L2
, . . . , pN , . . . , pN︸ ︷︷ ︸
LN
) ∈ P(K1, . . . , K1︸ ︷︷ ︸
L1
, K2, . . . , K2︸ ︷︷ ︸
L2
, . . . , KN , . . . , KN︸ ︷︷ ︸
LN
).
Thus, if we define
C := p1 Cj1 × · · · × p1 Cj1︸ ︷︷ ︸
L1
× p2 Cj2 × · · · × p2 Cj2︸ ︷︷ ︸
L2




then C ∈ 〈G, 〉, by defining formula (C11).
Now, for all n ∈ [1 . . . N ], let d1n, . . . ,dLnn ∈ DH(F,Cjn). Then combining formula
















































Applying (C17), this becomes p1 q1 v1 + · · · + pN qN vN ∈ DH(F,C). But pn qn = rn
for all n ∈ [1 . . . N ]. Thus, we get r1 v1 + · · ·+ rN vN ∈ DH(F,C). Thus, formula (C8)
yields r1 v1 + · · ·+ rN vN ∈ DH(F, 〈G, 〉), because C ∈ 〈G, 〉.
We can perform this construction for any (r1, . . . , rN) ∈ ∆N and v1, . . . ,vN ∈ V .
Thus, we conclude that conv(V) ⊆ DH(F, 〈G, 〉), as desired. 3 Claim 3
Claim 4: DH(F, 〈G, 〉) ⊆ conv(V).
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{r1 d1 + · · ·+ rN dN ; dn ∈ DH(F,CjN ), ∀ n ∈ [1...N ]}
(@)
{
r1 v1 + · · ·+ rN vN ; N ∈ N, vN ∈ V for all n ∈ [1 . . . N ] and r ∈ ∆J
}
= conv (V) ,
as claimed. Here, (∗) is by defining equation (C8) and (†) is by defining equation (C11).
Meanwhile, () is by Lemma C.4(b), with the convention that qm := |Cjm |/
∑N
n=1 |Cjn|,
for all m ∈ [1 . . . N ]. Next, (‡) is because defining formula (C10) implies that
(p1 q1, . . . , pN qN) ∈ ∆N for any (p1, . . . , pN) ∈ P(|Cj1|, . . . , |CjN |). Finally, (@) is
by the definition of V . 3 Claim 4
Claims 3 and 4 imply that DH(F, 〈G, 〉) = conv(V); this proves part (c). 2
The next lemma is actually Theorem 1(a).
Lemma C.5 Any additive majority rule satisfies Supermajority efficiency, Combination,
and Scale invariance in any judgement environment.
Proof: Let φ : [−1, 1]−→∗R be a gain function.
Supermajority efficiency. (by contrapositive) Let C = (K,λ,X ,Y) be a judgement
context. Let µ ∈ ∆(Y). We must show that Fφ(C;µ) ⊆ SME (C, µ). Contrapositively,
let y ∈ X , and suppose y 6∈ SME (C, µ); we will show that y 6∈ Fφ(C;µ).
Let Hµ := {|µ˜k|; k ∈ K}. For all x ∈ X , and all h ∈ Hµ, let Λh(x) :=
∑{λk;











Now, if y 6∈ SME (C, µ), then there is some x ∈ X such that γλx,µ(r) ≥ γλy,µ(r) for all
for all r ∈ [0, 1], with strict inequality for some r ∈ [0, 1]. From formula (C25), we
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see that this means that Λh(x) ≥ Λh(y) for all h ∈ Hµ, with strict inequality for some




h∈Hµ Λh(y)φ(h). Thus, formula (C24) implies
that y 6∈ Fφ(C, µ).
Combination and Scale invariance. Scale invariance is easily verified, so we focus on
Combination. Let E be a judgement environment. It suffices to prove the case J = 2
of the Combination axiom. (The general case then follows by induction on J .) So, let
C1 = (K1,λ1,X1,Y1) and C2 = (K2,λ2,X2,Y2) be two judgement contexts in E, and
let (K,λ,X ,Y) = C1 × C2. Thus, K = K1 unionsq K2, X = X1 × X2, Y = Y1 × Y2, and
λ = (λ1,λ2). Let µ ∈ ∆(Y), and let µ(1) and µ(2) be the marginal projections of µ onto
∆(Y1) and ∆(Y2) respectively, as defined by formula (5.3).
We claim that Fφ(C;µ) = Fφ(C1;µ(1)) × Fφ(C2;µ(2)). If x ∈ X , then x = (x1,x2) for
some x1 ∈ X1 and x2 ∈ X2. Meanwhile, µ˜ = (µ˜(1), µ˜(2)), so that φ(µ˜) = (φ(µ˜(1)), φ(µ˜(2))),










x ≥ φ(µ˜) •
λ






x1 ≥ φ(µ˜(1)) •λ1 y1, ∀ y1 ∈ X1 and φ(µ˜
(2)) •
λ2












Lemma C.6 Let G be a set of judgement contexts, and let F1 and F2 be two judgement
aggregation rules such that F1(G, µ) ⊆ F2(G, µ) for all G ∈ G and µ ∈ ∆H(G).
(a) If F1 and F2 satisfy Combination on ∆H〈G〉, then F1(C, µ) ⊆ F2(C, µ) for all
C ∈ 〈G〉 and µ ∈ ∆H(C).
(b) Suppose E is a judgement environment that satisfies condition (FG2) with re-
spect to G. If F1 and F2 satisfy Combination and Scale invariance on ∆H(E), then
F1(C, µ) ⊆ F2(C, µ) for all C ∈ E and µ ∈ ∆H(C).
Proof: We will prove part (b); the proof of (a) is very similar (but does not require
Scale invariance). Suppose G = {G1, . . . ,GN}. By (FG2), any C ∈ E has the form
C = p1Cn1 × · · · × pJCnJ for some p1, . . . , pJ ∈ R+ and n1, . . . , nJ ∈ [1 . . . N ]. Suppose
C = (K,λ,X ,Y) (where Y = Yn1 × · · · × YnJ , etc.) For any µ ∈ ∆H(Y) and any
j ∈ [1 . . . J ], let µ(j) ∈ ∆H(Ynj) be the nth marginal of µ, as defined by formula (5.3).








By hypothesis, F1(Gnj ;µ(j)) ⊆ F2(Gnj ;µ(j)) for all j ∈ [1 . . . J ]. Thus, F1(C, µ) ⊆
F2(C, µ), as desired. 2
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Lemma C.7 Let ψ : [−1, 1]−→∗R be a gain function. Suppose that either
(a) E = 〈G〉 for some finite collection G of judgement contexts; or
(b) E is a finitely generated judgement environment.
For any H ∈ ℘[0, 1], there exists a real-valued gain function φH : H−→R such that
FφH(C;µ) = Fψ(C;µ) for all C ∈ E and all µ ∈ ∆H(C).
Proof: We will prove Case (b) of the lemma; the proof of Case (a) is similar. Suppose E
is generated by the set G = {C1, . . . ,CN}. Lemma C.5 says that Fψ and FφH satisfy
Combination and Scale invariance on ∆H(E). Thus, Lemma C.6(b) tells us that it suffices
to construct φH such that FφH(Cn;µ) = Fψ(Cn;µ) for all µ ∈ ∆H(Cn) and all n ∈
[1 . . . N ].
Now, ∗R is a linearly ordered vector space. Thus, Hahn’s Embedding Theorem says
there is an order-preserving linear isomorphism α : ∗R−→L ⊂ RT , where T is a (pos-
sibly infinite) linearly ordered set, and the linear subspace L is endowed with the T -
lexicographical order, with smaller t-coordinates given lexicographical priority over larger
t coordinates; see e.g. Hausner and Wendel (1952), Clifford (1954), or Gravett (1956)
for details. (In particular, this means that, for any distinct `, `′ ∈ L, the set {t ∈ T ;
`t 6= `′t} has a minimal element.)30
For all n ∈ [1 . . . N ], suppose that Cn = (Kn,λn,Xn,Yn). Now, let n ∈ [1 . . . N ]. For







































for all t <
tµx,y. Since α is order-preserving and L is lexicographically ordered, this implies that(
x •
λn






















Let T ′ := {tµx,y; n ∈ [1 . . . N ], µ ∈ ∆H(Yn), and x,y ∈ Xn}. Then T ′ is finite, because
Xn and ∆H(Yn) are finite for all n ∈ [1 . . . N ]. Let <′ denote the linear order which T ′
inherits from T . For any t ∈ T ′, let |t| := #{t′ ∈ T ′; t′ <′ t}; thus, |t| ∈ N, because T ′
is finite. For any t1, t2 ∈ T ′, clearly (t1 < t2)⇔ (|t1| < |t2|).
Since L ⊂ RT , any ` ∈ L has the form ` = (`t)t∈T where `t ∈ R for all t ∈ T . Thus,





|t|, for all ` ∈ L. (C27)
Then define φ : H−→R by setting




|t|, for all h ∈ H. (C28)
30This technical remark is necessary because while T is linearly ordered, it may not be well-ordered, so
the “lexicographical order” is not necessarily well-defined on all of RT . But Hahn’s Embedding Theorem
ensures that it is well-defined on the subspace L.
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Then, for any n ∈ [1 . . . N ], any µ ∈ ∆H(Yn), and x,y ∈ Xn, we have
x •
λn
φ(µ˜)− y •λn φ(µ˜) (∗)
∑
k∈Kn
λnk xk β (α [ψ(µ˜k)])−
∑
k∈Kn










































a finite linear combination
of higher powers of 
)
.
(Here, (∗) is by equation (C28) and the definition of x •
λ
φ(µ˜). Next, (†) is because β
and α are both linear functions, and xk, yk, λ
n
k ∈ R for all k ∈ Kn. Finally, () is by
equation (C27) and the definition of tµx,y.) Thus, there exists some 
µ
x,y > 0 such that,
for any  ∈ (0, µx,y], statement (C26) entails(
x •
λn








φ(µ˜) > y •λn φ(µ˜)
)
. (C29)
Now define  := min{µx,y; x,y ∈ Xn, µ ∈ ∆H(Yn), and n ∈ [1 . . . N ]}. Then  > 0
because Xn and ∆H(Yn) are finite for all n ∈ [1 . . . N ]. Furthermore, for any n ∈ [1 . . . N ],
and any µ ∈ ∆H(Yn), statement (C29) now holds for all x,y ∈ Xn. Thus, Proposition
4.3(b) implies that
Fφ(Cn;µ) = Fψ(Cn;µ), for all n ∈ [1 . . . N ] and µ ∈ ∆H(Cn). (C30)
Now define φH := φ. Then Lemma C.6 and equation (C30) imply that FφH(C;µ) =
Fψ(C;µ) for all C ∈ 〈G〉 and all µ ∈ ∆H(C), as desired. 2
Finally, we come to the proofs of the main results of this appendix.
Proof of Theorem C.2. (a) “⇐=” If φH is strictly increasing, then for all C ∈ E
and µ ∈ ∆H(C), Lemma C.5 says FφH(µ) ⊆ SME (C, µ), and thus, F (µ) ⊆ SME (C, µ).
Thus, F satisfies Supermajority efficiency on ∆H(E).
“=⇒” Suppose E is finitely generated by a finite collection G of judgement contexts,
and let  > 0 be as in condition (FG3). By hypothesis, F is satisfies Supermajority effi-
ciency, Combination and Scale invariance on ∆H(E); thus, Lemmas C.1, C.2 and C.3(a,c)
together yield an all-positive vector z ∈ RH++ such that z•p ≤ 0 for all p ∈ DH(F, 〈G, 〉).





zh if r ≥ 0, and φ(r) := −φ(−r) if r ≤ 0. (C31)
Then φ is odd. Also, φ is increasing on ±H, because zh > 0 for all h ∈ H.
Let C = (K,λ,X ,Y) ∈ 〈G, 〉 and let µ ∈ ∆H(Y). For any x ∈ X , recall M(µ,x) :=
{k ∈ K; xk µ˜k ≥ 0}.





Proof: For any g, h ∈ [−1, 1], define δgh := 1 if g ≥ h, whereas δgh := 0 if g < h. Let
K := |K|. Then
z • g(x,C, µ) =
∑
h∈H
















































Here, () is by (C6), while (∗) is by (C31), because h ≥ 0 for all h ∈ H. 3 Claim 1
Claim 2: F (C;µ) ⊆ Fφ(C;µ) for all C ∈ 〈G, 〉 and µ ∈ ∆H(C).
Proof: Let x ∈ F (C;µ). For any other y ∈ X , defining formulae (C7) and (C8) yield
g(y,C, µ)− g(x,C, µ) ∈ DH(F, 〈G, 〉), so z • (g(y,C, µ)− g(x,C, µ)) ≤ 0, and hence
z • g(y,C, µ) ≤ z • g(x,C, µ). Thus, F (C;µ) ⊆ argmax
x∈X
(z • g(µ,C,x)). Thus, Claim
1 and Proposition 4.3(a) imply that F (C;µ) ⊆ Fφ(C;µ), as desired. 3 Claim 2
Now, G ⊆ 〈G, 〉. Thus, Claim 2 implies that F (G;µ) ⊆ Fφ(G;µ) for all G ∈ G and
µ ∈ ∆H(G). Thus, Lemma C.6(b) says that F (C;µ) ⊆ Fφ(C;µ) for all C ∈ E and
µ ∈ ∆H(C), as desired.
(b) Let cov(F ) be the set of additive majority rules which cover F on ∆H(E). Part (a)
implies that cov(F ) 6= ∅.
Claim 3: cov(F ) is finite.
Proof: Recall that G is finite. Suppose G = {C1, . . . ,CN}, where, for all n ∈ [1 . . . N ],
Cn = (Kn,λn,Xn,Yn). Now, Kn is finite and Yn ⊆ {±1}Kn ; thus, Yn is also finite.
Finally, H is finite, so ∆H(Yn) is finite. Thus, if Fn is the set of all possible judgement
aggregation rules from ∆H(Yn) into Xn, then Fn is also finite.
By Lemma C.6(b), any judgement aggregation rule F on ∆H(E) which satisfies
Combination and Scale invariance is obtained by choosing one rule Fn ∈ Fn for each
n ∈ [1 . . . N ]. Thus, the set of all judgement aggregation rules on ∆H(E) satisfying
Combination and Scale invariance is also finite. By Lemma C.5, this means the set of
all additive majority rules on ∆H(E) is finite. Thus, cov(F ) is finite. 3 Claim 3
Lemma C.7(b) implies that we can assume without loss of generality that all the rules
in cov(F ) have real-valued gain functions. Claim 3 implies that we can write cov(F ) =





Claim 4: Fφ covers F on ∆H(E).
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Proof: Let C = (K,λ,X ,Y) ∈ E and let µ ∈ ∆H(Y). Then for all ` ∈ [1 . . . L],
we have F (C;µ) ⊆ Fφ`(C;µ), by definition of the set cov(F ). This means: for all
x ∈ F (C;µ) and all other y ∈ X , we have φ`(µ˜) •λ x ≥ φ`(µ˜) •λ y. By summing these
inequalities over all ` ∈ [1 . . . L], it follows that φ(µ˜) •
λ
x ≥ φ(µ˜) •
λ
y. This holds for
all x ∈ F (C;µ) and all other y ∈ X ; it follows that F (C;µ) ⊆ Fφ(C;µ), as desired.
3 Claim 4
It remains to prove that Fφ is the minimal rule in cov(F ).
Claim 5: For all ` ∈ [1 . . . L], the rule Fφ` covers Fφ on ∆H(E).
Proof: (by contrapositive) Let C = (K,λ,X ,Y) ∈ E, let µ ∈ ∆H(Y), and suppose
x 6∈ Fφ`(C;µ) for some ` ∈ [1 . . . L]. We will show that x 6∈ Fφ(C;µ).
By hypothesis F is total, so there exists some y ∈ F (C;µ). Then for all `′ ∈
[1 . . . L], we have y ∈ Fφ`′ (C;µ), and thus, φ`′(µ˜) •λ y ≥ φ`′(µ˜) •λ x. In particular,
y ∈ Fφ`(C;µ), whereas x 6∈ Fφ`(C;µ); thus, φ`(µ˜) •λ y > φ`(µ˜) •λ x. By summing
these inequalities over all `′ ∈ [1 . . . L], it follows that φ(µ˜) •
λ
y > φ(µ˜) •
λ
x. Thus,
x 6∈ Fφ(C;µ). 3 Claim 5
Claims 4 and 5 imply that Fφ is a minimal covering of F by an additive majority rule.
If F is total, then clearly minimality implies uniqueness.
(c) This follows immediately from Lemma C.7. 2
Proof of Theorem C.1. The proof is identical to the proof of Theorem C.2, except
that the first paragraph invokes Lemma C.3(a,b) instead of Lemma C.3(a,c). Likewise,
later steps in the proof invoke Lemmas C.6(a) and C.7(a) instead of Lemmas C.6(b) and
C.7(b). Notice that we do not need F to satisfy Scale invariance to invoke any of these
lemmas, or at any other stage in the proof. 2
D Proofs of the main results in Section 5
Theorem 1 is obtained by using an ultrapower construction to “stitch together” the gain
functions defined in Theorems C.1 and C.2 for every possible choice of weight function H
and every finite sub-environment of E.
Proof of Theorem 1. Lemma C.5 says that any additive majority rule satisfies Super-
majority efficiency, Combination and Scale invariance. This proves part (a). It remains to
prove parts (b)-(d). Throughout the rest of the proof, we must distinguish between two
cases:
Case 1. E is a rationally weighted judgement environment.
Case 2. E is a minimally rich judgement environment, and F satisfies Scale invariance.
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We will use Theorem C.1 to handle Case 1, and and Theorem C.2 to handle Case 2.
(b) “⇐=” exactly the same proof as Theorem C.2.
“=⇒” Let ℘(E) be the set of all finite subsets of E (in Case 1) or finitely generated
sub-environments of E (in Case 2); we will denote a generic element of ℘(E) by D.
Note that in Case 2, we have 〈D〉 = D for any D ∈ ℘(E), by condition (FG1). Let
I := ℘[0, 1]×℘(E). Thus, I is a collection of possible “inputs” to Theorem C.1 (in Case
1) or Theorem C.2 (in Case 2).
For any finite collection T := {(C1, µ1), . . . , (CN , µN)} ⊂ ∆〈E〉, define IT := {(H,D) ∈
I; Cn ∈ 〈D〉 and µn ∈ ∆H(Cn) for all n ∈ [1 . . . N ]}. Then let F := {J ⊆ I; IT ⊆ J
for some nonempty finite T ⊂ ∆〈E〉}.
Claim 1: F is a free filter.
Proof: We must check axioms (F0)-(F2) from Appendix A.
(F0) Let T := {(C1, µ1), . . . , (CN , µN)} ⊂ ∆〈E〉. Let H ∈ ℘[0, 1] be arbitrary, and
suppose supp(H) = [1 . . .W ] for some W ∈ N. For all n ∈ [1 . . . N ], let Cn :=
(Kn,λn,Xn,Yn). Let M := W · |Y1| · |Y2| · · · |YN |, and let β : [1 . . .M ]−→[1 . . .W ]×
Y1×Y2×· · ·×YN be some bijection. DefineH′ ∈ ℘[0, 1] as follows: for allm ∈ [1 . . .M ],
if β(m) = (w,y1, . . . ,yN), then let H′(m) := H(w) · µ1(y1) · · ·µN(yN). It is easy
to check that (Cn, µn) ∈ ∆H′(Cn) for all n ∈ [1 . . . N ]. Let D ⊆ E be any finite
subset such that C1, . . . ,CN ∈ 〈D〉. (For example, let D = {C1, . . . ,CN}.) Then
(Cn, µn) ∈ ∆H′〈D〉 for all n ∈ [1 . . . N ]. Thus, (H′,D) ∈ IT .
We can repeat this construction for any H ∈ ℘[0, 1]; thus, IT is infinite. This
holds for any finite T ⊂ ∆〈E〉. Every element of F must contain IT for some finite
T ⊂ ∆〈E〉; thus, every element of F is infinite.
(F1) Let E ,F ∈ F. Then there exist finite sets S, T ⊂ ∆〈E〉 such that IS ⊆ E and
IT ⊆ F . But then S ∪T is also finite, and IS∪T = IS ∩IT ⊆ E ∩F ; thus, E ∩F ∈ F.
(F2) Suppose E ∈ F and E ⊆ D. Then there is some finite T ⊂ ∆〈E〉 such that IT ⊆ E .
But then IT ⊆ D; thus D ∈ F also. 3 Claim 1
Now Claim 1 and the Ultrafilter Lemma yields a free ultrafilter U with F ⊆ U. Let ∗R be





relation on RI defined by U. (See Appendix A for details.) We define φ : [−1, 1]−→∗R
as follows. For all (H,D) ∈ I, we can apply Theorem C.1(a) (in Case 1) or Theorem
C.2(a) (in Case 2) to obtain an odd, strictly increasing function φH,D : H−→R such that
the associated additive majority rule FφH,D covers F on ∆H〈D〉. Recall that H is a finite
subset of [−1, 1] (because H has finite support). Thus, we can extend φH,D to an odd,
continuous increasing function φH,D : [−1, 1]−→R, by linearly interpolating the values
between the points in H. Now, for any r ∈ [−1, 1], define φ̂(r) ∈ RI by:
φ̂(r)(H,D) := φH,D(r), for all (H,D) ∈ I. (E1)
Then define φ(r) ∈ ∗R to be the ≈
U
-equivalence class of φ̂(r).
Claim 2: φ is odd and strictly increasing.
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Proof: Odd. Let r ∈ [−1, 1]. For all (H,D) ∈ I, we have φH,D(−r) = −φH,D(r), because
φH,D is odd by construction. But I ∈ U, by definition of U. Thus, φ(−r) = −φ(r).
Increasing. Let h, i ∈ [−1, 1], with h < i. For all (H,D) ∈ I, we have φH,D(h) <
φH,D(i), because φH,D is increasing by construction. But I ∈ U by definition of U.
Thus, we obtain φ(h) < φ(i), by defining formula (A1). 3 Claim 2
Claim 3: For any C ∈ 〈E〉 and µ ∈ ∆(C), we have F (C;µ) ⊆ Fφ(C;µ).
Proof: Suppose C = (K,λ,X ,Y). Let µ ∈ ∆(Y) and let x ∈ F (C;µ); we must show
that x ∈ Fφ(C;µ). For all (H,D) ∈ I{(C;µ)}, Theorem C.1(a) (in Case 1) or Theorem
C.2(a) (in Case 2) says that F (C;µ) ⊆ FφH,D(C;µ); thus, for all y ∈ X , we have
(x−y) •
λ
φH,D(µ˜) ≥ 0. Thus, if we define Iy := {(H,D) ∈ I; (x−y) •λ φH,D(µ˜) ≥ 0},
then Iy ⊇ I{(C;µ)}. But I{(C;µ)} ∈ U; thus, Iy ∈ U, by axiom (F2) from Appendix
A. (In other words: (x − y) •
λ
φH,D(µ˜) ≥ 0 for “almost all” (H,D) in I.) Thus,
(x − y) •
λ
φ(µ˜) ≥ 0, by defining formula (A1). This holds for all y ∈ X ; thus,
x ∈ Fφ(C;µ). This holds for all x ∈ F (C;µ); thus, F (C;µ) ⊆ Fφ(C;µ). 3 Claim 3
Now let G := Fφ to prove part (b).
(c) If F is total, then F (C;µ) is always nonempty. Thus, F (C;µ) = Fφ(C;µ) whenever
Fφ(C;µ) is single-valued. But φ is strictly increasing, so Fφ is single-valued on a dense,
open subset of ∆(Y), by Proposition 4.4(b).
(d) Suppose F is total. For all (H,D) ∈ I, Theorem C.1(b) (in Case 1) or Theorem C.2(b)
(in Case 2) says that we can choose the gain functions φH,D such that the additive
majority rule FφH,D is the unique minimal covering of F on ∆H(D). Suppose we perform
the construction in part (b) using this set of gain functions; we claim the resulting rule
Fφ is a minimal covering of F on ∆〈E〉.
To see this, let ψ : [−1, 1]−→∗R be another gain function, such that the additive
majority rule Fψ covers F on ∆〈E〉. Let C ∈ 〈E〉 and let µ ∈ ∆(C); we must show that
Fφ(C;µ) ⊆ Fψ(C;µ). So, let x ∈ Fφ(C;µ); we will show that x ∈ Fψ(C;µ).
Suppose C = (K,λ,X ,Y). For all y ∈ X , let Ix,y := {(H,D) ∈ I; x •λ φH,D(µ˜) ≥
y •
λ
φH,D(µ˜)}. Then Ix,y ∈ U, by formula (A1) (because x •λ φ(µ˜) ≥ y •λ φ(µ˜), because
x ∈ Fφ(C;µ)). Thus, if we define
Ix :=
{






then Ix ∈ U, by axiom (F1) (because it is a finite intersection of U-elements, because X
is a finite set). Thus, Ix is nonempty, by axiom (F0).
Now, for all (H,D) ∈ I{(C;µ)}, the rule Fψ covers F on ∆H(D). Thus, Fψ also covers
FφH,D (because FφH,D is the minimal covering of F on ∆H(D), by hypothesis). Thus, if
we take any (H,D) ∈ Ix, we obtain x ∈ FφH,D(C;µ) ⊆ Fψ(C;µ). Thus, x ∈ Fψ(C;µ).
This argument works for all x ∈ Fφ(C;µ). Thus, Fφ(C;µ) ⊆ Fψ(C;µ), as desired. 2
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The proof of Theorem 2 uses the following result.
Lemma E.1 Let X ⊆ Y ⊆ {±1}K, and let F,G : ∆(Y)⇒ X be two judgement aggregation
rules. Suppose F (µ) ⊆ G(µ) for all µ ∈ ∆(Y), and G is monotone, and F is continuous
and total. Then F (µ) = G(µ) for all µ ∈ ∆(Y).
Proof: Let µ ∈ ∆(Y). We have F (µ) ⊆ G(µ) by hypothesis; we must show F (µ) ⊇ G(µ).
So, let x ∈ G(µ); we will show that x ∈ F (µ). Let δx ∈ ∆(Y) be the unanimous profile
at x. For all n ∈ N, define µn := (1− 1n)µ+ 1nδx. Then µn is more supportive of x than
µ, so G(µn) = {x} because G is monotone. Thus, F (µn) = {x} because F ⊆ G, and
F (µn) must be nonempty because F is total. However, lim
n→∞
µn = µ, and F is continuous.
Thus, x ∈ F (µ), as desired. 2
Proof of Theorem 2. “=⇒” This follows from Theorem 1(a).
“⇐=” Let φ be the gain function from Theorem 1(b). Then Fφ covers F . The rule Fφ
is monotone, by Proposition 4.4(a). Meanwhile F is continuous and total by hypothesis.
Thus, Lemma E.1 implies that F (µ) = Fφ(µ) for all µ ∈ ∆(Y). 2
Proof of Proposition 5.3. Suppose C = (K,λ,X ,Y). Let {µn}∞n=1 ⊂ ∆(Y) and µ ∈ ∆(Y),
and suppose limn→∞ µn = µ. Let x ∈ X , and suppose x ∈ Fφ(C, µn) for all n ∈ N; we























λk (xk − yk)φ(µ˜nk) =
∑
k∈K



















Here, (∗) is because the map ∆(Y) 3 µ 7→ µ˜ ∈ RK is continuous, and (†) is because φ is
continuous. Next, (‡) is because (x−y) •
λ
φ(µ˜n) ≥ 0 for all n ∈ N, because x ∈ Fφ(C, µn).
Thus, x •
λ
φ(µ˜) ≥ y •
λ
φ(µ˜) for all y ∈ X . Thus, x ∈ Fφ(C, µ) as desired. 2
Proof of Theorem 3. This follows from Theorem C.1; let H := {m
N
; m ∈ [0 . . . N ]}. 2
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F More on representation by ∗R-valued gain functions
First, we demonstrate two statements made at the end of Section 5 showing why a real-
valued representation of the Leximin rule is not possible in general, and how a hyper-real
valued representation overcomes this difficulty.
Proposition F.1 Let E be any judgement environment.
(a) There is no real-valued gain function φ such that Leximin = Fφ on ∆N (E) for all
N ∈ N.
(b) If ω is an infinite hyperreal number, then Hω is well-defined and equal to Leximin.
Proof: (a) (by contradiction) Suppose Leximin = Fφ for some real-valued gain function
φ, and consider a population of size N . In the Leximin rule, a single majority of M





). If q := M
N
and  = 1
N
, then we get φ(q) > 2 · φ(q − ). But if N can be
arbitrarily large, then  can be arbitrarily small, while q can be any rational number in
[0, 1]. Thus, we obtain φ(q) > 2 · φ(q′) for all rationals q′ < q in [0, 1]. Clearly, it is
impossible for any real-valued function to behave in this way.
(b) For any r, s ∈ [0, 1], if r > s and ω is infinite, then the ratio rω/sω is infinite
(because it must be larger than (r/s)N for any N ∈ N). Thus, for any judgement





x > φ(µ˜) •
λ
y; hence y 6∈ Fφ(C, µ). This shows that Fφ(C, µ) ⊆ Leximin(C, µ).
On the other hand, for any x,y ∈ Leximin(C, µ), we must have x ≈
µ
y, which means
γµ,x = γµ,y, which means x •λ φ(µ˜) = y •λ φ(µ˜). Thus Fφ(C, µ) = Leximin(C, µ). 2
The alert reader will have noticed that we do not need the full structure of ∗R to
define additive majority rules, or to obtain some of our auxiliary results. Since, for these
purposes, we only multiply by reals, not by hyperreals, we can make do with a much
thinner structure. A linearly ordered vector space is a triple (L,+, ·, >), where L is a set,
+ is binary operation making L into an abelian group (i.e. + is associative, commutative,
and invertible), · is a “scalar multiplication” operation of R on L which distributes over +,
and > is a linear ordering relation compatible with +, and ·: for all `,m ∈ L and r ∈ R,
we have ` > 0 iff ` + m > m, and r ` > 0 if r > 0 and ` > 0, or if r < 0 and ` < 0.
For example, R and ∗R are both linearly ordered vector spaces. Another example is RN
with the lexicographical ordering. An L-valued gain function is now any increasing function
φ : [−1, 1]−→L. Given any L-valued gain function φ, we can define the additive majority
rule Fφ as in equation (4.7).
At first it might appear that this definition provides greater generality than the hyperreal-
valued gain functions considered in the text. However, this extra generality is illusory.
Indeed, the next result says that one can make do with the hyperreal field that is already
given by the ultrapower construction in the proof of Theorem 1.
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Proposition F.2 Let L be any linearly ordered vector space, and let ψ : [−1, 1]−→L be any
gain function. Then there exists a hyperreal field ∗R and a gain function φ : [−1, 1]−→∗R
such that, for any judgement problem (C;µ) (weighted or unweighted), Fφ(C;µ) = Fψ(C;µ).
The proof requires the following variant of Lemma C.7.
Lemma F.3 Let L be a linearly ordered vector space, and let ψ : [−1, 1]−→L be a gain
function. Let E = 〈G〉 for some finite collection G of judgement contexts. For any H ∈
℘[0, 1], there exists a real-valued gain function φH : H−→R such that FφH(C;µ) = Fψ(C;µ)
for all C ∈ E and all µ ∈ ∆H(C).
Proof: The proof is identical to the proof of Lemma C.7(a) —simply replace ∗R with L
everywhere. 2
Proof of Proposition F.2. The proof strategy is almost identical to the proof of Theorem
1(b). Let E be the set of all judgement contexts. (Thus, E = 〈E〉.) Define I as in the
proof of Theorem 1, and for each (H,D) ∈ I, let φH,D : H−→R be the gain function
from Lemma F.3. Then define φ : [−1, 1]−→∗R as in Eq.(E1). The proof of Claim 2 is
exactly as before. But we replace Claim 3 with the following:
Claim 3′: For any C ∈ E and µ ∈ ∆(C), we have Fφ(C;µ) = Fψ(C;µ).
To prove Claim 3′, let C = (K,λ,X ,Y). Suppose x ∈ Fψ(C;µ) and z ∈ X \ Fψ(C;µ).
We must show that x ∈ Fφ(C;µ) and z 6∈ Fφ(C;µ). For all (H,D) ∈ I{(C;µ)}, Lemma F.3
says that Fψ(C;µ) = FφH,D(C;µ); thus, for all y ∈ X , we have (x − y) •λ φH,D(µ˜) ≥ 0,
and furthermore, (x − z) •
λ
φH,D(µ˜) > 0. Thus, if we define Iy,≥ := {(H,D) ∈ I;
(x − y) •
λ
φH,D(µ˜) ≥ 0}, then Iy,≥ ⊇ I{(C;µ)}. Also, if we define Iz,> := {(H,D) ∈ I;
(x−z) •
λ
φH,D(µ˜) > 0}, then Iz,> ⊇ I{(C;µ)}. But I{(C;µ)} ∈ U; thus, we get Iy,≥ ∈ U and
Iz,> ∈ U , by axiom (F2) from Appendix A. Thus, (x− y) •λ φ(µ˜) ≥ 0, by the defining
formula (A1). This holds for all y ∈ X ; thus, x ∈ Fφ(C;µ). Likewise, (x−z) •λ φ(µ˜) > 0
by the defining formula (A1), so z 6∈ Fφ(C;µ). 2
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